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Abstract: 
Should executive control, as indicated by working memory capacity (WMC) and mind-
wandering propensity, help or hinder creativity? Sustained and focused attention should help 
guide a selective search of solution-relevant information in memory and help inhibit uncreative, 
yet accessible, ideas. However, unfocused attention and daydreaming should allow mental access 
to more loosely relevant concepts, remotely linked to commonplace solutions. Three individual-
differences studies inserted incubation periods into 1 or 2 divergent thinking tasks and tested 
whether WMC (assessed by complex span tasks) and incubation-period mind wandering 
(assessed as probed reports of task-unrelated thought [TUT]) predicted postincubation 
performance. Retrospective self-reports of Openness (Experiment 2) and mind-wandering and 
daydreaming propensity (Experiment 3) complemented our thought-probe assessments of TUT. 
WMC did not correlate with creativity in divergent thinking, whereas only the questionnaire 
measure of daydreaming, but not probed thought reports, weakly predicted creativity; the fact 
that in-the-moment TUTs did not correlate with divergent creativity is especially problematic for 
claims that mind-wandering processes contribute to creative cognition. Moreover, the fact that 
WMC tends to strongly predict analytical problem solving and reasoning, but may not correlate 
with divergent thinking, provides a useful boundary condition for defining WMC’s nomological 
net. On balance, our data provide no support for either benefits or costs of executive control for 
at least 1 component of creativity.  
Keyword: divergent thinking | executive attention | individual differences | mind wandering | 
working memory 
Article: 
What’s the best way to creatively generate a new idea? Should we cognitively buckle down, as 
when wrestling with a complex syllogism in logic class, and attempt to screen distractions from 
external stimuli and task-irrelevant thoughts? Or, might we be better off loosening up, allowing 
the mind to roam freely to sights, sounds, and ideas that seem only remotely connected to the 
task at hand? To determine whether creativity comes to those who work or to those who wander, 
we heeded Underwood’s (1975) advice that individual differences provide a critical test-bed for 
theorizing. Specifically, in three studies we examine the extent to which two indices of executive 
control—working memory capacity and propensity for mind wandering—predict normal 
variation in divergent thinking. 
The literature already indicates that individual differences in working memory capacity (WMC) 
predict important cognitive abilities and outcomes, such as reasoning (e.g., Kane, Hambrick, & 
Conway, 2005; Oberauer, Schulze, Wilhelm, & Süß, 2005), language comprehension 
(e.g., Daneman & Merikle, 1996; Just & Carpenter, 1992), multitasking (Hambrick, Oswald, 
Darowski, Rench, & Brou, 2010; König, Bühner, & Mürling, 2005), learning (e.g., Engel de 
Abreu & Gathercole, 2012; Shute, 1991), and academic performance (e.g., Cowan et al., 
2005; Gathercole, Pickering, Knight, & Stegmann, 2004). The breadth of these associations, 
along with research showing that WMC variation also correlates with performance on “simpler” 
attention-control tasks (e.g., Conway, Cowan, & Bunting, 2001; Kane & Engle, 2003; Unsworth 
& Spillers, 2010), has led some theorists to propose that domain general executive-control 
mechanisms contribute significantly to WMC and its predictive power (e.g., Braver, Gray, & 
Burgess, 2007; Engle & Kane, 2004; Hasher, Lustig, & Zacks, 2007; Unsworth & Engle, 2007). 
But that predictive power has limits. In domains of lower-level cognition, the executive 
processes related to WMC appear important to restraining habitual but inappropriate responses 
(e.g., Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001; Hutchison, 2011; Unsworth, Schrock, & Engle, 
2004), constraining attentional focus amid distractors (e.g., Ahmed & de Fockert, 2012; Heitz & 
Engle, 2007; Redick & Engle, 2006), and sustaining conscious focus to ongoing tasks 
(e.g., McVay & Kane, 2009, 2012a; Unsworth, Redick, Lakey, & Young, 2010). They do not, 
however, seem to contribute to guiding visual search through large stimulus arrays (e.g., Kane, 
Poole, Tuholski, & Engle, 2006; Poole & Kane, 2009; Sobel, Gerrie, Poole, & Kane, 2007) or 
switching rapidly between competing task sets (e.g., Kane, Conway, Hambrick, & Engle, 
2007; Oberauer, Süß, Schulze, Wilhelm, & Wittmann, 2000; Oberauer, Süß, Wilhelm, & 
Wittmann, 2003). Dissociations like these suggest boundary conditions to the WMC-executive 
association, which should benefit theory by specifying the nomological net (Cronbach & Meehl, 
1955; Meehl, 1978) around the still-vague executive attention construct. 
Here we explore whether similar dissociations arise in a domain of higher-order cognition, 
suggesting that WMC is important to some complex cognitive abilities but not to others; indeed, 
we will test whether executive control may actually be counterproductive in some task contexts. 
On one hand, many complex cognitive abilities, such as reasoning and analytical problem 
solving, rely on executive-control processes to keep task goals, rules, and partial solutions 
accessible and shielded from distraction, as well as to guide strategic memory search (e.g., Cho, 
Holyoak, & Cannon, 2007; Hambrick & Engle, 2003; Kaplan & Simon, 1990; Wiley & Jarosz, 
2012). On the other hand, insightful problem solving and divergent thinking may not. The 
literature is actually mixed regarding the role that executive processes play in these creative 
domains—some argue that executive control is helpful for insight and divergent thinking 
(e.g., Beaty & Silvia, 2012; Gilhooly & Fioratou, 2009; Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony, & Wynn, 
2007; Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011), whereas others maintain that a lack of cognitive control is ideal 
(Baird et al., 2012; Chrysikou & Thompson-Schill, 2011; Limb & Braun, 2008; Reverberi, 
Toraldo, D’Agostini, & Skrap, 2005). 
Our three experiments will assess the influence of executive control on creativity in two ways: 
(a) by correlating performance on divergent thinking tasks with WMC, and (b) by borrowing a 
design from the incubation literature to measure propensity for mind wandering, or task-
unrelated thoughts (TUTs), during breaks within divergent thinking tasks, to see whether 
frequent TUT experiences are associated with more or less creative divergent thinking. Although 
correlation does not necessarily imply causation, causation does imply statistical association, and 
so current theoretical perspectives that claim cognitive control benefits creative thinking also 
predict that people with better control (i.e., greater WMC) should be the most creative, whereas 
theories that claim a lack of cognitive control benefits creative thinking also predict that people 
with worse control (i.e., greater mind-wandering propensity) should be the most creative. Strictly 
speaking, the association implied by causation need not be linear, but current theoretical claims 
imply linearity. Our study’s correlational methods put these theoretical claims to a critical test 
(à la Underwood, 1975). 
Potential Benefits of Executive Control to Creativity 
Generating novel and useful interpretations of old items and ideas may be hindered by one’s 
knowledge of norms and commonplace uses (e.g., Gilhooly et al., 2007), and so innovative and 
creative ideas arise only after abandoning these constraints. For example, in the alternative uses 
task, a common laboratory measure of divergent thinking (Guilford, 1967), subjects initially 
output “creative” uses for common objects that were simply retrieved from memory (Gilhooly et 
al., 2007). These mundane responses are easily accessible and so people who stop thinking about 
them and switch to a more effective strategy will generate more creative responses (Gilhooly et 
al., 2007). Indeed, when subjects must subsequently distinguish their responses that were 
retrieved from memory from those generated on the spot, their executive-control abilities 
(indexed by verbal fluency) predicted on-the-spot responding but not retrieved-from-memory 
responding (Gilhooly et al., 2007). Thus, executive control might facilitate creative thinking. 
Few studies have assessed the relation between WMC and divergent thinking, and they have 
yielded mixed results (Benedek, Jauk, Sommer, Arendasy, & Neubauer, 2014; De Dreu et al., 
2012; Lee & Therriault, 2013; Lin & Lien, 2013). However, a growing literature has suggested a 
contribution of general fluid intelligence (Gf), the domain-general ability to reason through novel 
analytical problems (Carroll, 1993; Horn & Cattell, 1967). Gf correlates strongly with WMC 
(≈.70–.80 at the latent-variable level; Kane, Hambrick, & Conway, 2005; Oberauer et al., 2005) 
and moderately with creative responding in divergent thinking, alternative-uses, tasks (≈.35–.45 
at the latent level; e.g., Gilhooly et al., 2007; Silvia, 2008a; see also Batey, Furnham, & 
Safiullina, 2010), suggesting that that the shared executive-related variance between WMC and 
Gf might predict divergent thinking. Moreover, Nusbaum and Silvia’s (2011, Study 1) latent-
variable analyses indicated that the association between Gf and divergent thinking was mediated 
by the executive process of switching between categories of alternate uses (i.e., total number of 
broad categories of uses) but not clustering (i.e., number of uses produced in each category), 
which may involve successful inhibitory control (e.g., Gilhooly et al., 2007). Their Study 2 
provided half the subjects with a helpful strategy for producing creative uses in the divergent 
thinking task, specifically to disassemble the object and reassemble the parts. Strategy instruction 
amplified, rather than reduced, the Gf-divergent thinking correlation, indicating that the 
executive abilities associated with Gf help maintain a strategy in memory and apply it 
effectively. 
Potential Costs of Executive Control to Creativity 
The evidence reviewed so far indicates that executive control is generally helpful to creative 
cognition. But other findings, from the Remote Associates Test (RAT) and from the mind-
wandering literature, suggest otherwise. The RAT presents subjects with three seemingly 
unrelated words that are, in fact, associated with a common word or concept (e.g., PAINT—
DOLL—CAT: “house”; Mednick & Mednick, 1967). Solving such problems requires thinking 
divergently, to explore the semantic space for each word, and then convergently, to derive the 
common associate, and is sometimes accompanied by a subjective “aha” feeling of insight 
(e.g., Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004). Although solving RAT 
problems is sometimes positively correlated with WMC (De Dreu et al., 2012; Kane et al., 
2004; Ricks, Turley-Ames, & Wiley, 2007), it is also sometimes facilitated by thwarting 
cognitive control via alcohol intoxication or instruction. Jarosz, Colflesh, and Wiley 
(2012) equated two groups of subjects on WMC using a verbal-symbolic span task, then left one 
group entirely sober and had the other group consume .88g/kg of body weight in vodka. An hour 
later, subjects completed the span task again as well as the RAT. The sober group showed 
positive practice effects on the WMC task, but the intoxicated group did not, suggesting 
decreased executive control in those who consumed alcohol. At the same time, the intoxicated 
group solved more RAT problems, did so faster, and experienced more subjective insight than 
did controls. Strategic suppression of control may also aid RAT performance: Aiello, Jarosz, 
Cushen, and Wiley (2012) instructed half their subjects to “use your gut” in solving RAT 
problems and they performed better than did uninstructed control subjects. The authors suggest 
that the “use your gut” instruction reduced subjects’ reliance on attentional control mechanisms 
to solve the problems. 
Propensity for mind wandering during ongoing tasks also seems to be negatively associated with 
control abilities and positively associated with creative thought. During challenging tasks, at 
least, people with lower WMC report more TUTs than do those with higher WMC (Kane et al., 
2007; McVay & Kane, 2009, 2012a, 2012b; Unsworth, Brewer, & Spillers, 2012; Unsworth & 
McMillan, 2013; Unsworth, McMillan, Brewer, & Spillers, 2012; for a meta-analytic review, 
see Randall, Oswald, & Beier, 2014). Some theorists argue that mind wandering is automatically 
triggered by environmental and mental cues to personal goals and concerns, and to represent, in 
part, a failure of the executive control system to block interference from TUTs (Kane & McVay, 
2012; McVay & Kane, 2010; see also Smallwood, 2013). Based on the typically negative 
consequences that are associated with attention-control failure, then, one might predict that mind 
wandering would be harmful to performance in complex and demanding tasks such as creative 
problem solving. 
Alternatively, some have suggested that mindwandering experiences, in which we mentally 
escape the confines of the present, may be beneficial to personal goal striving (e.g., Klinger, 
1971, 2013; McMillan, Kaufman, & Singer, 2013; Singer, 1966) and to creativity (Baars, 
2010; Schooler et al., 2011; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Informal support comes from 
countless anecdotes that illustrate fruitful mind wandering during an incubation period, from 
Archimedes’ apocryphal “eureka” moment in the bath, to Nobel laureate Kary Mullis’s insight 
into amplifying DNA sequences while driving along a California freeway (Mullis, 1998). Direct 
empirical support, however, is harder to come by. A small study by Singer and Schonbar 
(1961) found that graduate students scoring higher on a retrospective daydreaming questionnaire 
wrote more creative accounts of a daydream and a more creative fictional story. In contrast, a 
large-scale study of undergraduates (Singer & Antrobus, 1963) found no associations between a 
battery of divergent thinking tasks and various daydreaming-questionnaire factors; in exploratory 
factor analyses, the only daydream-related factor that also included divergent-thinking scores 
reflected uncontrolled mind wandering and distractibility and, here, the loading for divergent 
thinking was negative, indicating poorer creativity in the most frequent mind-wanderers. 
Indirect empirical evidence from the incubation literature, however, supports a positive role for 
mind wandering in creative thinking. Dozens of studies have evaluated the effects of various 
incubation tasks (i.e., taking a break from an initial task to work on an unrelated task) on insight 
problem solving and divergent thinking; although some found that an incubation period benefits 
subsequent performance (known as the “incubation effect”), others have not. A meta-analysis 
categorizing studies by problem type (e.g., divergent thinking, visual insight, or verbal insight 
problems) and incubation-task demands (e.g., rest, low cognitive demand, high cognitive 
demand) found a modest incubation benefit (M effect size = 0.29; 95% CI [0.21, 0.39]; Sio & 
Ormerod, 2009). Incubation periods had positive effects on all three task types (M effect sizes = 
.22–.29), but moderation analyses specified that low-demand incubation tasks yielded better 
subsequent performance on divergent thinking and verbal insight tasks than did high-demand 
tasks (but limited data-points for divergent thinking prevented strong conclusions about 
cognitive demand). 
Schooler et al. (2011) thus argued that incubation tasks with low cognitive demands should allow 
abundant opportunities for TUTs, whereas tasks with high demands would not (e.g., Antrobus, 
Singer, & Greenberg, 1966; Teasdale et al., 1995; Teasdale, Proctor, Lloyd, & Baddeley, 1993), 
and suggested that mind wandering might thus contribute to creative thinking. Smallwood and 
Schooler (2006, p. 956) also drew parallels between incubation processes and mind wandering, 
suggesting that the suddenness of insight, “may sometimes occur because mind wandering 
addresses more remote goals (e.g., discerning the solution to a heretofore unsolved problem).” 
While we collected data for our second experiment here, Baird et al. (2012) reported suggestive 
findings that incubation-period mind wandering increased divergent creativity. Subjects 
completed one of four incubation tasks—an undemanding task, a demanding task, unstructured 
rest, or no break—midway through a set of divergent thinking tasks to generate novel uses for 
everyday objects. Following incubation, subjects retrospectively rated their TUT frequency and 
then returned to the divergent thinking tasks. Baird et al. did not report the correlation between 
divergent thinking scores and self-reported TUT rate during incubation, which was actually 
critical to their theoretical claim that mind-wandering processes affected creativity. They did 
find, however, that the undemanding incubation condition produced both the most mind 
wandering and the most improvement in divergent creativity scores from pre- to postincubation 
(i.e., there was a correlation between the experimental effect on mind wandering and the 
experimental effect on divergent creativity; a causal path from mind wandering to creativity 
should not be implied). In contrast to findings from Singer and Antrobus (1963), postincubation 
divergent creativity scores correlated positively (r ≈ .20) with scores on a general retrospective 
questionnaire of daydreaming frequency in daily life (Singer & Antrobus, 1972), collapsed 
across all experimental groups. Mind wandering and creativity may thus appear to be linked in 
some way (but see Singer & Antrobus, 1963), but there is currently no direct evidence for the 
causal claim that mind wandering facilitates creativity, or its individual-differences corollary that 
people who experience more TUTs during a particular incubation task will thus perform more 
creatively than will those who experience less off-task thinking. 
The Present Work 
We suggest that the literature—including studies of WMC and mind wandering—is mixed 
regarding the benefits versus costs of executive-control variation to individual differences in 
creative cognition. In the current investigation, then, we focused on multiple measures of WMC 
and incubation-period mind-wandering propensity as indicators of executive control (and its 
failure), and multiple measures of divergent thinking as markers of creative cognition. For 
WMC, we created a composite score for each subject from two complex span tasks, operation 
span and symmetry span (Conway et al., 2005). For creative cognition, we had hoped to assess 
both convergent creativity, where people must derive a particular correct answer or product, and 
divergent creativity, where there is not only one answer or product. We measured convergent 
creativity with two visual insight problems (in both Experiments 1 and 2), and we measured 
divergent creativity by combining three raters’ judgments of creative responding across two 
divergent thinking tasks that asked subjects to generate clever, original, unusual, uncommon, and 
creative uses for an object (Experiments 1–3). Unfortunately, very few subjects solved the 
insight problems in either experiment, and the solution rates for each problem were highly 
inconsistent across experiments. We therefore were unable to draw conclusions from these tasks 
and will not discuss them further (beyond what is required to make the overall study procedures 
clear). We measured mind-wandering propensity with unpredictable thought probes that were 
embedded into ongoing tasks — during a baseline, stand-alone task and, of most importance, 
during the incubation tasks inserted into the insight problems and divergent thinking tasks. 
Experiment 1 
To test whether incubation improves divergent thinking because it promotes mind wandering, we 
chose two tasks that we knew provided a supportive environment for TUTs: the Sustained 
Attention to Response Task (SART), for the stand-alone assessment of TUTs, and the n-back 
task, for the incubation-task assessment of TUTs. Previous work has consistently shown that 
subjects mind wander approximately 30% to 50% of the time while working on the SART 
(e.g., McVay & Kane, 2009, 2012a; McVay, Meier, Touron, & Kane, 2013); the n-back has been 
used successfully as an incubation task (Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006) and induces comparable 
TUT rates to the SART (McVay et al., 2013). 
Method 
We report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions, all manipulations, and all 
measures in these studies (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2012). 
Subjects 
Undergraduates enrolled in introductory psychology courses at the University of North Carolina 
at Greensboro (UNCG) earned partial credit toward a course requirement for participating in two 
120 min sessions. Using two complete semesters as our data-collection stopping rule, 173 
students completed the first session and 142 returned to complete the second in that time. To 
minimize attrition, we gave most credits upon completion of Session 2. Unless stated otherwise, 
data analyses included only students who completed both sessions. 
Working memory span tasks 
We assessed WMC with two “complex span” tasks that are commonly used to measure WMC in 
younger adults (Redick et al., 2012; Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005; Unsworth, 
Redick, Heitz, Broadway, & Engle, 2009). Both tasks—operation span and symmetry span—
required subjects to perform a processing task while simultaneously remembering short lists of 
unrelated items in serial order. Each task began with three practice blocks: The first allowed 
subjects to practice the memory component for four trials (two each of set sizes two and three), 
the second provided practice on the processing component for 15 trials, and the third combined 
both the memory and processing components for 8 trials. For critical test trials, response 
deadlines for the processing task ensured that subjects did not pause to rehearse the memory 
items; deadlines were calculated individually for each subject using the response times from the 
processing-component practice block (M + 2.5 SDs). If subjects exceeded the deadline on any 
trial, the task moved on and counted that item as an error. 
Operation span 
The processing component of this task required subjects to solve a math problem [for example, 
(9 ÷ 3) + 2 = ?] and then evaluate the solution (e.g., 6) presented on the next screen by clicking 
the computer mouse on the word TRUE or FALSE; each equation was followed by one of 12 
possible letters to remember F, K, P, S, H, L, Q, T, J, N, R, and Y). After 3 to 7 equation-letter 
pairs, subjects saw the 12 letters onscreen and used the mouse to select the targets in their serial 
order. A total of 15 trials presented 3 sets of each size (3–7) in random order. 
Symmetry span 
Subjects evaluated the vertical symmetry of a black-and-white 8 × 8 grid pattern while 
remembering the location of a subsequently presented red square within a 4 × 4 matrix. After 2 
to 5 symmetry-square pairs, subjects saw an empty 4 × 4 matrix and used the computer mouse to 
recall the locations of the red squares in serial order. A total of 12 trials presented 3 sets of each 
size (2–5) in random order. 
Mind-wandering assessment: Ongoing tasks and thought probes 
Mind wandering was measured by randomly probing subjects about their immediately preceding 
thoughts during 20-min cognitive tasks. The SART served as a stand-alone measure and four 
versions of the n-back served as incubation tasks. 
SART 
In this go/no-go task, subjects viewed a sequence of words, presented one at a time, and decided 
whether each was an animal or a food (McVay & Kane, 2009). Each word appeared for 300 ms, 
followed by a 900-ms mask. If the word was an animal, subjects pressed the space bar as quickly 
as possible (89% of the 900 trials). If the word was a food, subjects withheld response and 
pressed no key (11% of trials). Following 60% of the critical, no-go stimuli, a thought probe 
asked subjects to characterize the content of their thoughts in the moment preceding the probe 
(see below for details). 
n-back 
Subjects decided whether each sequentially presented word matched the one presented two 
words back. If the words matched (e.g., green, blue, green), subjects pressed the space bar as 
quickly as possible (25% of the 336 trials). If the words didn’t match, subjects withheld response 
(75% of trials); a subset of nontarget trials (21%) were lures that presented either 1-back matches 
(e.g., blue, green, green) or 3-back matches (e.g., green, blue, purple, green). Each word 
appeared for 500 ms, followed by a 2500-ms fixation cross. Three thought probes appeared 
unpredictably during each of the seven task blocks, two of which appeared immediately after a 2-
back target. Four versions of the n-back functioned as the incubation-period task for the two 
insight problems and two divergent thinking tasks, each presenting different stimulus categories 
(from Battig & Montague, 1969; Van Overschelde, Rawson, & Dunlosky, 2004): colors, 
countries, body parts, and musical instruments (see Appendix B for item lists). 
Mind-wandering probes 
Each probe screen asked, “What were you just thinking about?” Subjects’ reported their thoughts 
via key-press to these on-screen choices: (1) the current task; (2) my performance on the task; (3) 
off-task: tune out (knew it all along); (4) off-task: zone out (without knowing it). We explained 
“tuning out” as when a person is fully aware that she is mind-wandering, and “zoning out” as 
when she doesn’t realize that she is mind-wandering until something in the environment (like the 
thought probe) interrupts her, or she catches herself. We took instructions to subjects from one of 
several published studies that distinguished tune-outs from zone-outs (Smallwood, McSpadden, 
& Schooler, 2007, p. 533), with only slight modifications and with some text varying according 
to the ongoing task in which the probes were embedded: 
During this experiment you will be asked at various points whether your attention is firmly 
directed toward the task, or alternatively you may be aware of other things besides the task. 
Occasionally you may find as you are performing the task that you are thinking about something 
completely unrelated to what you are doing; this is what we refer to as “mind wandering.” We 
believe there are two forms of mind wandering: 
TUNING OUT. Sometimes when your mind wanders, you are aware that your mind has drifted, 
but for whatever reason you still continue to do the task. This is what we refer to as “tuning 
out”— that is, when your mind wanders and you know it all along. 
ZONING OUT. Other times when your mind wanders, you do not realize that your thoughts 
have drifted away from the task until you catch yourself. This is what we refer to as “zoning 
out”— that is, when your mind wanders, but you do not realize this until you catch it. 
Schooler has informally speculated (quoted in Glausiusz, 2011; Tierney, 2010) that 
distinguishing tune-outs from zone-outs may be important because creative insights while zoning 
out may go unnoticed. It is not clear to us, however, whether the tune-out/zone-out distinction—
as understood by research subjects —captures anything more than a continuum from less to more 
off-task. Therefore, our analyses scored responses of either “3” (tuning out) or “4” (zoning out) 
as a TUT, or mind-wandering experience; we note, however, that in exploratory analyses we 
assessed tune-outs and zone-outs separately, but in no case did the findings from these differ 
from each other or from the overall TUT pattern, so we do not report them here. We considered 
responses of “2”, reflecting thoughts about one’s own performance, as “task related interference” 
(TRI; Smallwood, Riby, Heim, & Davies, 2006), which does not represent either fully on-task or 
off-task thought (McVay & Kane, 2009, 2012a, 2012b; McVay et al., 2013). 
Divergent creativity: Alternative uses tasks 
Two versions of the “alternative uses” task (e.g., Guilford, 1967) assessed individual differences 
in divergent creativity. In both, subjects generated as many creative uses for an everyday object 
(a brick or a knife) as they could. After 5 min on the task, subjects switched to the incubation n-
back task for approximately 20 min, and then switched back to the same alternative uses task for 
another 5 min (see Figure 1). To best assess creative thinking, our instructions emphasized that 
subjects should list creative, clever, original, unusual, and uncommon uses that are unlike any 
uses that they had seen or heard of before. Without such “be creative” instructions, divergent 
thinking tests resemble simple verbal-fluency tasks more than creativity tasks (Nusbaum, Silvia, 
& Beaty, 2014; see also Harrington, 1975; Silvia, 2008a). Below are the relevant verbatim 
instructions for the Knife task: 
In this task, we are interested in how creative and original you can be in coming up with new 
ideas - here, in thinking up unique and clever ways to use an everyday object. Specifically, we 
would like you to generate as many original, clever, and creative uses for a knife that you can 
think of. 
Certainly there are many common and everyday ways to use a knife. But for this task, we want 
you to list all of the unusual and uncommon uses that you can invent or think of. Try to think 
creatively, and try to come up with clever uses for a knife that are not like any uses that you’ve 
ever seen or heard of before. Your goal is to try to develop such original and clever uses for a 
knife that few other UNCG students will come up with the same ideas as you. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Incubation design for alternative uses task in Experiment 1. One alternative uses task 
was completed in Session 1 (e.g., alternative uses for a brick) and another in Session 2 (e.g., 
alternative uses for a knife) counterbalanced across subjects. 
After each 5-min period, subjects saw a list of their responses from that period on-screen and 
retyped what they thought were their two best answers; after the second period they also 
subsequently chose their best two answers from the full 10 min. Asking subjects for their best 
responses allowed us to use “top-two” scoring, in addition to a “total” score that averaged across 
all of their responses. We provide more information about scoring below. 
General procedure 
All subjects were tested individually by an undergraduate or graduate experimenter who 
remained in the testing room throughout the session. Dell desktop computers, with 17-in. LCD or 
CRT monitors and running E-Prime 1.2 software, presented all task stimuli and collected all 
responses. In the first session, subjects completed the SART, one of the alternative uses tasks 
(including an n-back incubation period), symmetry span, and one of the excluded insight 
problems (see footnote 1 regarding the excluded problem-solving tasks), in that order. In the 
second session, they completed a demographic survey, one of the excluded analytical-filler 
problems, operation span, the other excluded insight problem, the other version of the alternative 
uses task (including an n-back incubation period), and the other excluded analytical-filler 
problem, in that order. We counterbalanced the insight and alternative uses tasks such that half 
the subjects completed Coins and Brick in Session 1 and half completed Pigpen and Knife in 
Session 1 (the incubation n-back tasks were not counterbalanced, and were encountered in this 
order: countries, body parts, instruments, and colors). 
Scoring 
Working memory tasks 
We scored both operation span and symmetry span using partial credit scoring (Conway et al., 
2005), in which the total number of items recalled in correct serial position was summed across 
the task. These scores were then individually converted into z scores based on our database of 
3,393 UNCG students, and then averaged to create a WMC composite. We retained task data 
from only those participants who scored ≥85% accuracy on the processing component of the 
span task, as is conventional, in order to be sure that retained subjects were not ignoring the 
processing portion of the span task and treating the task as a “simple” or “short-term memory” 
span task requiring only memory rehearsal (e.g., Conway et al., 2005; Redick et al., 2012). 
TUT rates 
We categorized all off-task thought reports (i.e., tuning out and zoning out) as mind wandering, 
and calculated TUT rate separately for each task; TUT rate refers in each task to the proportion 
of thought probes on which a subject endorsed either tuning or zoning out. 
Alternative uses tasks 
Three raters (the first author and two other UNCG psychology graduate students who have 
published research on creativity) scored each subject’s individual responses on a scale of 1–5. 
For scoring purposes, the raters were told to view creative ideas as having three facets: they are 
uncommon but apt, they are remotely linked to everyday objects and ideas, and they are often 
clever. The raters saw an alphabetized spreadsheet of all responses, from all subjects in 
Experiments 1 and 2, presented without any identifying information. Each spreadsheet of 
responses was alphabetized differently (i.e., A–Z, Z–A, and M–Z/A-L) to eliminate the 
possibility that responses later in the alphabet would be scored differently. We asked the raters to 
read the entire list of responses before they started rating responses in the order they received 
them. Finally, raters were asked to use the entire range of scores while rating, and after they were 
finished, the raters sorted the responses by score to ensure that this was true. Raters showed 
adequate agreement (Brick α = .688, Knife α = .689) that was consistent with prior work using 
such ratings (e.g., Silvia, 2008a). 
After all ratings were complete, we calculated scores for each subject in three ways: (a) 
an average score, by taking an average across all of a subject’s responses; (b) a top-two score, by 
averaging across the two best responses selected by the subject; (c) a max-two score, by 
averaging across the two responses that were the most highly rated. For all of these divergent 
creativity scores, ratings were first averaged across raters for each response, and then across all 
of the responses for each person. Prior research indicates that average scoring is a bit more 
reliable than top-two scoring, but top-two scoring may have greater validity than average 
scoring, insofar as it better predicts creative personalities (Silvia, 2008a). We added max-two 
scoring as another means by which to assess subjects’ best ideas, but without requiring optimal 
discernment, which might also covary with executive control capabilities. 
Results 
For all analyses, we report null hypothesis significance tests with an alpha of .05 and, where 
appropriate, Cohen’s d or partial eta squared (ηp2) to estimate effect size. 
Subjects 
Data from subjects were omitted from analyses for scoring less than 85% on the processing 
component of either complex span task (18 people) and exceptionally poor performance on the 
SART or n-back tasks with embedded thought probes (4 people); “poor performance” outliers 
were determined by collapsing nontarget accuracy across n-back tasks and excluding anyone 
who had an accuracy of ≤75% in either the collapsed n-back or on the nontarget trials of the 
stand-alone SART (M accuracy rates and RTs appear in Appendix C). A total of 120 people were 
included for analyses, ranging in age from 18–29 years (M = 19.12, 65.8% female). By self-
report, the final sample’s racial composition was 58.3% White, 28.3% African American, 5.8% 
Asian, 5.0% Multiracial, and 2.5% Other; for ethnicity, reported separately, 5% self-identified as 
Latino/Hispanic. Subjects completed both sessions within a mean of 15.2 (SD = 12.9) days. 
Primary analyses 
Here we present analyses that are central to our hypotheses; we address secondary questions and 
exploratory analyses in the subsequent section. 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for WMC and TUT rates, and Table 2 presents the 
correlations among these variables. Operation span and symmetry span correlated fairly well, 
allowing us to collapse their z scores into a WMC composite, which was normally distributed 
with a mean close to zero (indicating a sample representative of our larger database). On 
average, subjects reported TUTs to about 40% of task probes, whether the task stood alone (i.e., 
SART) or represented an incubation task (i.e., n-backs); a one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) indicated no statistical differences in TUT rates across tasks, F(4, 592) = 0.71, p = 
.58, MSE = 0.06, ηp2 = .01. Furthermore, TUT rates correlated significantly across all pairwise 
tasks, rs = .24 to .65, suggesting that mind wandering was also reasonably consistent across 
people. WMC, however, did not correlate consistently with TUT rate. Significant negative 
correlations arose from the n-back incubation tasks within the two insight tasks, but not from the 
alternative uses tasks or the stand-alone SART (the latter of which failed to replicate prior 
findings from our laboratory; McVay & Kane, 2009, 2012a). 
 
Table 1. Experiment 1 Descriptive Statistics for Working Memory Capacity Tasks and Mind-
Wandering Rates 
Task N M SD Min Max Skew Kurtosis 
Sspan Z 120 -.062 .975 -2.742 1.832 -.396 -.094 
Ospan Z 120 .061 .949 -3.279 1.546 -.941 1.258 
WMC Z 120 -.001 .782 -1.637 1.589 -.253 -.613 
SART TUT 119 .367 .196 .033 .800 .203 -1.072 
Coins TUT 120 .413 .260 0 1 .272 -.750 
PigPen TUT 119 .399 .252 0 1 .396 -.489 
Brick TUT 120 .397 .236 0 1 .438 -.462 
Knife TUT 119 .413 .261 0 1 .432 -.575 
Note. Z = z scores based on database of more than 3,000 people; WMC = working memory 
capacity; SART = sustained attention response task; TUT = task-unrelated thought proportion. 
 
Table 2. Experiment 1 Correlations Among Working Memory Capacity Tasks and Mind-
Wandering Rates 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Sspan Z 1.00         
2. Ospan 
Z 
.32** 1.00        
3. WMC 
Z 
.82** .81** 1.00       
4. SART 
TUTs 
-.04 -.01 -.03 1.00      
5. Coins 
TUTs 
-.22 -.15 -.23* .40** 1.00     
6. Pigpen 
TUTs 
-.15 -.15 -.19* .45** .48** 1.00    
7. Brick 
TUTs 
-.04 -.05 -.06 .36** .65** .50** 1.00   
8. Knife 
TUTs 
-.03 -.10 -.08 .48** .41** .61** .24** 1.00  
9. 
Incubation 
TUTs 
-.14 -.17 -.19* .54** .81** .83** .75** .73** 1.00 
 
In Experiment 1, we first assessed the consistency of divergent thinking scores across tasks, and 
found that overall creativity ratings (collapsed across both pre- and postincubation) in the Brick 
task correlated well with overall creativity in the Knife task, across average scoring, r(117) = 
.58, p < .001, top-two scoring, r(117) = .38, p < .001, and max-two scoring, r(117) = .59, p < 
.001. Therefore, for all subsequent alternative-uses analyses, we averaged scores across Brick 
and Knife tasks to create our divergent creativity measures. Note, however, that we did so 
separately for preincubation task periods and postincubation task periods, thus creating 
preincubation divergent thinking scores and postincubation divergent thinking scores (and also 
allowing use to calculate a pre-to-post incubation change score). 
Is executive control helpful or harmful for creativity? 
We first operationalize executive control variation via WMC scores. WMC did not correlate with 
postincubation divergent-thinking scores, for average, r(114) = .01, p = .90, top-two, r(114) = 
.07, p = .47, or max-two, r(114) = .03, p = .72 scoring. To consider executive control variation as 
reflected by TUT propensity, we averaged the TUT rates across the two alternative-uses 
incubation periods. Mind wandering did not correlate with postincubation divergent creativity 
scores for average, r(114) = −.08, p = .42, top-two, r(114) = −.10, p = .29, or max-two, r(114) = 
.01, p = .92, scoring methods. To make closer contact with Baird et al. (2012), whose primary 
analyses were on percent improvement in divergent creativity scores from pre- to postincubation, 
we also computed change as they did: [(postincubation divergent creativity − preincubation 
divergent creativity)/preincubation divergent creativity] × 100. Incubation TUT rate did not 
correlate with creativity percent change: average, r(114) = −.08, p = .38, top-two, r(114) = 
−.07, p = .45, max-two, r(114) = .02, p = .85 (nor did TUTs correlate with a simple pre-to-post 
difference score, with rs = −.09 to .02, ps = .33 to .83). 
Although both WMC and TUT rate showed null associations with divergent thinking, people 
who are high in WMC and TUT rates may be more creative than others. To test whether the 
WMC × TUT interaction predicted divergent thinking, we used average postincubation creativity 
scoring as the outcome measure in a hierarchical linear regression. WMC and alternative-uses-
incubation TUT rate entered at Step 1 and the interaction of the two (WMC × TUT) entered in at 
Step 2. The interaction effect was not significant (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Experiment 1 WMC × TUT Hierarchical Linear Regression on Divergent Thinking 
 95% CI for B 
Predictors B SE β t p Lower Upper 
Block 1 (ΔR2 = .006) 
WMC z 
score 
.002 .029 .006 .068 .946 -.056 .059 
DT TUT 
Rate 
-.023 .029 -.075 -.792 .430 -.080 .034 
Constant 2.044 .029  71.459 .000 1.987 2.101 
Block 2 (ΔR2 = .010) 
WMC × 
TUT 
.034 .031 .102 1.086 .280 -.028 .095 
Note. WMC = working memory capacity; DT = divergent thinking; TUT = task-unrelated 
thoughts; N = 116; all predictors are z scores based on the final sample (for centering purposes). 
Secondary and exploratory analyses 
Here we asked whether executive control variation predicted preincubation creativity. It did not: 
Neither WMC nor TUT rate had significant effects. Preincubation divergent thinking scores did 
not correlate with WMC [average scoring: r(117) = .14, p = .14; top-two scoring: r(117) = 
.13, p = .18; max-two scoring: r(117) = .04, p = .66]. Examining TUT rates based on 
preincubation performance is particularly informative because it can tell us whether subjects 
mind-wander strategically if they are given a reason to do so (i.e., if they might productively 
mind-wander to help generate new alternative uses of a brick). They did not. Preincubation 
divergent thinking scores did not correlate with incubation-period TUT rates [average 
scoring: r(117) = −.04, p = .65; top-two scoring: r(117) = −.10, p = .29; max-two scoring: r(117) 
= −.02, p = .85]. 
Discussion 
The main questions that Experiment 1 addressed, from an individual-differences perspective, 
were whether executive control is helpful or harmful for postincubation creative thinking. WMC 
did not correlate with postincubation creativity (or preincubation creativity, or pre-to-post change 
in creativity) as assessed by ratings of divergent-thinking output. Our findings for incubation-
period TUT rates were also clear and consistent: Mind wandering showed no association with 
divergent thinking. Moreover, being higher in both WMC and mind-wandering propensity, 
which might allow one to regulate their off-task thinking toward productive ends, did not 
improve divergent-thinking performance. Finally, mind wandering did not increase for subjects 
who had not yet provided high-quality alternate uses in the divergent thinking tasks. In general, 
then, we find no evidence that executive control—or its failure—contributes to individual 
differences in the creativity of divergent thinking (whether before or after incubation). 
We found, but did not expect, that WMC-TUT correlations were inconsistent across tasks: 
Whereas higher WMC predicted lower TUT rates during n-back incubation in the insight 
problems (with typically modest magnitudes), they did not within the alternative uses incubation 
tasks or the stand-alone SART; in the multilevel model that combined TUT rates across all 5 
tasks, the WMC effect on TUTs did not reach conventional significance (β = −0.22, SE = 
.14, p = .11). We do not know whether these discrepant findings across tasks reflect meaningful, 
systematic differences between contexts that elicit versus suppress a WMC-TUT association, or 
whether we are simply dealing with random variation around a small but true negative effect 
(note that none of the correlations here were positive). As noted by Kane and McVay (2012), 
long-duration SARTs tend to elicit small WMC-TUT correlations, in the range of r = −.20 
(McVay & Kane, 2009, 2012a), and shorter-duration SART-like tasks elicit still weaker 
correlations that only reach magnitudes of −.20 at the latent-variable level, reflecting shared 
variance across multiple WMC and TUT-rate assessments (McVay & Kane, 2012b). Given that 
all the tasks here were in the short-duration range of 20 min (vs. 40+ min), we consider it most 
likely that WMC has a generally weak association with TUTs during tasks that require executive 
control to block distractions or regulate habitual responding, and that tasks that do not stress 
these control processes to their limits by requiring them over long periods of time will be less 
likely to detect it. Although it requires more data from more laboratories to effectively test such a 
claim, a recent meta-analysis (Randall et al., 2014) indicated that WMC and other cognitive 
ability measures show a significant but small negative correlation with laboratory TUT rates (ρ = 
−.14 [−.09 – −.19]) and that this correlation is significantly stronger in tasks that are longer than 
30 min (ρ = −.20 [−.15 – −.24]) versus shorter than 30 min (ρ = −.07 [.01 – −.15]). 
We designed Experiment 2 to replicate our null WMC results and to better understand our null 
mind-wandering results. That is, Experiment 2 explored whether our null TUT-creativity 
associations derived from the particular incubation task that we used. We chose the n-back for 
Experiment 1, not only because it has been used successfully as an incubation task before 
(Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006), but also because it elicits substantial TUT rates (McVay et al., 
2013); indeed, subjects in Experiment 1 reported mind wandering on approximately 40% of n-
back probes, with considerable variation around that mean. At the same time, the Sio and 
Ormerod (2009) meta-analysis suggested that incubation tasks with lower cognitive load were 
most likely to show benefits, and a 2-back task arguably presents a higher-than-ideal load (see 
also Baird et al., 2012). Of course, if incubation benefits require low cognitive load to occur, but 
mind wandering can be substantial even in high load tasks like the 2-back, then it suggests that 
mind wandering is not the active ingredient behind creative incubation. In any case, because the 
Sio and Omerod meta-analysis also indicated that reading science fiction frequently elicits 
significant incubation (e.g., Smith & Blankenship, 1991), Experiment 2 incubation tasks required 
word-by-word reading of science fiction texts as a means to give mind wandering its best 
opportunity to show some creative benefits. 
Experiment 2 
The procedure matched that in Experiment 1, but we changed the incubation task and we 
assessed two personality dimensions relevant to creative problem solving (e.g., Schooler & 
Melcher, 1995; Silvia et al., 2008): Openness to experience (from the Openness subscale of the 
NEO-PI-3; McCrae & Costa, 2010) and Need for Cognition (from the Need for Cognition 
questionnaire; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). These measures addressed novel hypotheses 
about interest and motivation. People who score high on personality scales of Openness tend to 
be intellectually curious and are motivated to be creative (McCrae, 1987), and those who score 
high on Need for Cognition tend to choose to engage in critical thinking and enjoy it when they 
do (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). We thus used these measures to indicate intrinsic motivation and 
valuing creative goals—two factors that could positively impact performance (for a meta-
analysis, see de Jesus, Rus, Lens, & Imaginário, 2013). Specifically, in separate moderator 
analyses we tested whether the impact of WMC, mindwandering, or both, on divergent creativity 
would be stronger for subjects who were higher in Openness or Need for Cognition. 
Additionally, recall that Baird et al. (2012) found that a retrospective measure of daydreaming 
modestly correlated with divergent thinking. Although we had begun data collection when that 
study was published, we were able to take advantage of the “fantasy” facet within the Openness 
to experience measure. The fantasy facet is conceptually similar to what was measured in the 
Baird et al. daydreaming measure, and so we investigated the correlations among our fantasy 
measure, in-the-moment TUT reports, and divergent-thinking measures. 
Method 
Subjects 
To match our sample sizes across experiments, while accounting for likely data loss, we aimed to 
collect complete datasets from 120–130 people in both sessions. Once again, introductory 
psychology students at UNCG earned partial credit toward a course requirement for participating 
in each of two 120 min sessions (earning more credit for Session 2 than Session 1). Again, using 
two complete semesters as our data-collection stopping rule, 154 undergraduates, who had not 
participated in Experiment 1, completed the first session of Experiment 2; of those, 131 students 
returned to complete the second session. 
Working memory span tasks 
Working memory tasks and assessments were identical to those in Experiment 1. 
Mind-wandering assessment: Ongoing tasks and thought probes 
Reading tasks 
For each incubation task and the stand-alone task for TUT assessment, subjects read a different 
science fiction story excerpt, presented one word at a time on-screen, and responded by pressing 
the space bar whenever they detected an anomaly. Specifically, for the reading tasks, we used the 
first 1200 words from Chapter 1 of the following novels: Across the Universe (Beth 
Revis), Divergent (Veronica Roth), Rex Rising (Chrystalla Thoma), Whatever Became of the 
Squishies? (Claire Chilton), and True Hero? (Jack Hessey). We also used the first 67 words 
of The House of Scorpion (Nancy Farmer) as practice trials for the stand-alone reading task. 
On 5% of the word trials, two adjacent words were swapped (e.g., “Bill played fetch his 
with dog.”), representing an anomaly target. Subjects were asked to read normally but to respond 
to any anomaly only after they had seen the second swapped word (e.g., following “with”). 
Nearly identical to the n-back procedure in Experiment 1, each word appeared for 400 ms, 
followed by a 600-ms blank screen (we had also noted that Smallwood, McSpadden, and 
Schooler [2008] reported M = 304 ms per word in a word-by-word reading study). We presented 
words at a constant pace, rather than allowing subjects to read at their leisure, to control for 
individual differences in reading speed and to ensure that all subjects had the same incubation 
time. During this 20-min task, subjects saw approximately 1200 words, 61 of which were targets; 
thought probes appeared immediately after approximately 60% of the targets, for 35 probes total 
(Experiment 1 SART had presented 60; Experiment 1 n-backs each presented 21). After each 
story, subjects answered five multiple-choice questions, via mouse click, to motivate their 
reading for comprehension. 
Mind-wandering probes 
Thought probes and their instructions were identical to those in Experiment 1. 
Divergent creativity: Alternative uses tasks 
Divergent thinking tasks and assessments were identical to those in Experiment 1. 
Noncognitive assessments 
We combined the Openness and Need for Cognition scales into one computer-presented 
questionnaire, using a repeating pattern of two Openness items, followed by one Need for 
Cognition item, followed by three Openness items, followed by one Need for Cognition item, 
followed by three Openness items, followed by one more Need for Cognition item; the sequence 
then repeated until all 66 items were included. All responses used a 5-point Likert-type scale 
(i.e., labeled with strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, and strongly agree). 
Openness 
This questionnaire, taken from the NEO-PI-3 (McCrae & Costa, 2010), comprises six facets: (a) 
fantasy (e.g., “I enjoy concentrating on a fantasy or daydream and exploring all its possibilities, 
letting it grow and develop”); (b) aesthetics (e.g., “I am intrigued by the patterns I find in art and 
nature”); (c) feelings (e.g., “I experience a wide range of emotions or feelings”); (d) actions (e.g., 
“I think it’s interesting to learn and develop new hobbies”); (e) ideas (e.g., “I often enjoy playing 
with theories or abstract ideas”), and (f) values (e.g., “I consider myself broad-minded and 
tolerant of other people’s lifestyles”). Eight items defined each facet, with half reverse-coded. 
Although we were primarily interested in the general openness construct, we were secondarily 
interested in the fantasy facet, which, at face value, measures engagement in fantastical thinking 
and daydreaming. 
Need for cognition 
We used the short form of the Need for Cognition questionnaire (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984), 
which consists of 18 questions, nine of which are reverse-coded (e.g., “I find satisfaction in 
deliberating hard and for long hours”; “I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must 
solve”; “Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much” [reverse scored]). Although 
the original questionnaire used a −4 to +4 Likert-type scale, we used a −2 to +2 scale to keep the 
responses consistent with the openness measure in the combined questionnaire (i.e., strongly 
disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, and strongly agree). 
General procedure 
As in Experiment 1, we tested subjects individually across two 2-hr sessions with the same 
computers. In Session 1, subjects completed the stand-alone reading task, one of the alternative 
uses tasks, symmetry span, and one of the excluded insight problems (see Footnote 1 regarding 
excluded problem-solving measures). In Session 2, they completed a demographic survey, an 
excluded analytic problem, operation span, another excluded insight problem, the other 
alternative uses task, and finally, the noncognitive questionnaire containing Openness and Need 
for Cognition scales. Subjects completed the tasks in the aforementioned order for each session. 
Results 
Subjects 
Data from 15 subjects were omitted for failing the processing-portion criterion (85% accuracy on 
the processing component) on either span task and from one subject who was older than our 
target age range of 18 to 30 years. Using the same incubation-task-accuracy criterion as in 
Experiment 1, outliers were determined by collapsing nontarget accuracy across all reading tasks 
(both stand-alone and incubation), but here, no one’s accuracy was 75% or less and so we 
retained data from all remaining subjects (Appendix D presents mean accuracy and RTs). Data 
from 115 subjects were included for analyses, who ranged in age from 18–28 years (M = 18.84, 
67.0% female). By self-report, the final sample’s racial composition was 55.7% White, 31.3% 
African American, 3.5% Asian, 5.2% Multiracial, 1.7% Native American or Alaskan Native, and 
2.6% Other; for ethnicity, reported separately, 4.3% self-identified as Latino/Hispanic. Subjects 
completed both sessions within a mean of 18.9 (SD = 17.4) days. 
Primary analyses 
As in Experiment 1, we begin with analyses that are central to our hypotheses; the subsequent 
section addresses secondary questions and exploratory analyses. 
Descriptive statistics 
Tables 4 and 5 present descriptive statistics for WMC and TUT measures, and for the 
noncognitive measures, respectively. Table 6 presents correlations among the WMC and TUT 
measures and Table 7 presents the correlations between the noncognitive measures and the 
WMC and TUT variables. As in Experiment 1, we collapsed across the two WMC tasks 
(operation span and symmetry span) to create one WMC z score composite measure; these 
WMC z scores were lower in Experiment 2 (M = −0.19, SD = 0.83) than in Experiment 1 (M = 
0.00, SD = 0.78), t(233) = 1.82, p = .07, 95% CI [−0.02, 0.40], d = 0.24, but this near-significant 
difference reflected only a small effect. 
 
Table 4. Experiment 2 Descriptive Statistics for Working Memory Capacity Tasks and Mind-
Wandering Rates 
Task N M SD Min Max Skew Kurtosis 
Sspan Z 115 -.311 1.035 -2.615 1.959 -.262 -.641 
Ospan Z 115 -.071 1.004 -3.145 1.546 -.844 .573 
WMC Z 115 -.191 .826 -.2783 1.585 -.507 .124 
Stand-alone TUT 115 .257 .213 0 .861 .937 .213 
Coins TUT 114 .265 .228 0 1 .950 .446 
PigPen TUT 114 .279 .252 0 .944 1.128 .401 
Brick TUT 115 .298 .245 0 1 .931 .170 
Knife TUT 115 .317 .263 0 1 .719 -.268 
Note. Z = z scores based on database of over 3,000 people; WMC = working memory capacity; 
TUT = task-unrelated thought proportion. 
 
Table 5. Experiment 2 Descriptive Statistics for Noncognitive Variables 
Variable N M SD Min Max Skew Kurtosis 
Fantasy Facet 115 .615 1.109 -1.543 3.022 -.050 -.721 
Aesthetics 
Facet 
115 .755 .996 -2.000 2.561 -.320 -.396 
Feelings Facet 115 .602 1.067 -2.049 2.829 -.465 .185 
Actions Facet 115 .467 1.169 -2.194 3.917 .399 .201 
Ideas Facet 115 .428 .845 -1.259 2.630 .294 .130 
Values Facet 115 .349 1.077 -2.643 2.833 -.073 -.003 
Openness 115 .810 1.050 -2.242 3.134 .003 .114 
Need for 
Cognition 
115 -.046 .993 -2.729 2.836 .132 -.011 
Note. All measures are z scores; Openness measures are based on normed means and standard 
deviations provided by McCrae & Costa (2010). Need for Cognition was calculated internally. 
 
Table 6. Experiment 2 Correlations Among Working Memory Capacity Tasks and Mind-
Wandering Rates 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Sspan Z 1.00         
2. Ospan Z .31** 1.00        
3. WMC Z .82** .80** 1.00       
4. Stand-alone 
TUTs 
-.03 .18 .09 1.00      
5. Coins TUTs -.06 -.05 -.07 .53** 1.00     
6. Pigpen TUTs .01 .18 .11 .56** .64** 1.00    
7. Brick TUTs .03 .06 .05 .56** .71** .58** 1.00   
8. Knife TUTs .01 .12 .08 .60** .48** .72** .40** 1.00  
9. Incubation 
TUTs 
-.01 .10 .06 .67** .84** .89** .80** .80** 1.00 
Note. Z= z scores based on database of more than 3,000 people; WMC = working memory 
capacity; TUT = task-unrelated thought proportion; Incubation tasks were collapsed across all 
four reading-incubation tasks. N = 113–115. **p < .01. 
 
Table 7. Experiment 2 Correlations of Noncognitive Variables With Working Memory Capacity 
Tasks and Mind-Wandering Rates 
Variable Fantasy 
Facet 
Aestheti
cs 
Facet 
Feelings 
Facet 
Actions 
Facet 
Ideas 
Facet 
Values 
Facet 
Openne
ss 
Need for 
Cognitio
n 
1. Sspan Z .05 .05 -.13 -.22* .04 -.04 -.05 -.15 
2. Ospan Z -.06 -.17 -.13 -.23* -.16 -.13 -.21* -.13 
3. WMC Z .00 -.07 -.16 -.28** -.07 -.10 -.16 -.17 
4. Stand-alone 
TUTs 
.14 -.04 .03 -.03 -.03 .04 .03 .00 
5. Coins TUTs .13 .10 .07 .20* -.02 .02 .12 .00 
6. Pigpen TUTs .02 .07 -.05 .13 -.12 .03 .02 -.09 
7. Brick TUTs -.02 .01 .05 -.04 -.19* -.07 -.06 -.10 
8. Knife TUTs .15 .13 -.01 .17 -.09 .18 .13 -.12 
9. Incubation TUTs .07 .08 .01 .14 -.13 .04 .05 -.11 
10. Average Pre Inc 
DT 
.28** .22* .18 .29** .06 .21* .30** .03 
11. Average Post 
Inc DT 
.24* .12 .17 .22* .09 .22* .26** .01 
12. Top-Two Pre 
Inc DT 
.18 .10 .15 .13 -.04 .05 .14 -.04 
13. Top-Two Post 
Inc DT 
.17 .01 .17 .26** .09 .14 .20* .01 
14. Max-Two Pre 
Inc DT 
.25* .17 .16 .18 -.02 .02 .19* .00 
15. Max-Two Post 
Inc DT 
.21* -.02 .09 .13 .03 .04 .11 -.03 
Note. Z = z scores based on database of more than 3,000 people; WMC = working memory 
capacity; TO = tune outs; ZO = zone outs; TUT = task-unrelated thoughts; DT = divergent 
thinking; Pre Inc = pre-incubation; Post Inc = post-incubation. N = 108–115. * p < .05. ** p< 
.01. 
On average, across all reading tasks, subjects reported TUTs to approximately 30% of thought 
probes, whether the reading task stood alone or as an incubation task. Just as in Experiment 1, a 
one-way ANOVA did not indicate TUT rate differences across tasks, F(4, 568) = 1.18, p = 
.32, MSE = 0.06). Furthermore, TUT rates again correlated substantially across all across all 
pairwise tasks, rs = .40 to .72, indicating between-subjects stability. Overall, TUT rates were 
significantly lower here, in the reading tasks, than in the Experiment 1 SART and n-back tasks, 
and this remained true whether we took the average TUT rate across all five tasks, t(229) = 
4.52, p < .001, 95% CI [0.06, 0.16], d = 0.59, or compared the tasks one-by-one: Stand-
alone, t(232) = 4.12, p < .001, 95% CI [0.06, 0.16], d = 0.54; Brick, t(233) = 3.15, p = .002, 95% 
CI [0.04, 0.16], d = 0.41; Knife: t(232) = 2.80, p = .006, 95% CI [0.03, 0.16], d = 0.37. Negative 
correlations between WMC and TUT rate were of inconsistent magnitude and statistical 
significance across tasks in Experiment 1, but here, in apparent contrast, WMC tended toward 
weak and nonsignificant positive correlations with TUT rate. 
Overall divergent creativity scores (collapsed across pre- and postincubation) in the Brick task 
correlated well with those in the Knife task, regardless of using average, r(111) = .56, p< .001, 
top-two, r(111) = .40, p < .001, or max-two scoring, r(111) = .50, p < .001. As in Experiment 1, 
then, we averaged Brick and Knife scores from preincubation periods to create a single 
preincubation divergent creativity measure for each subject, and the Brick and Knife scores from 
postincubation periods to create a single postincubation divergent creativity measure for each 
subject (for each scoring system). 
Is executive control helpful or harmful for creativity? 
We first consider WMC as an indicator of executive control. WMC failed again to significantly 
predict postincubation alternative uses scores, for average r(106) = .04, p = .72; top-two, r(106) 
= −.03, p = .76; max-two r(106) = .04, p = .72. 
We next consider mind-wandering propensity as a measure of executive control. Also consistent 
with Experiment 1, TUT rates during alternative uses incubation did not predict divergent 
creativity scores, either for average, r(106) = .04, p = .70, top-two, r(106) = −.07, p = .45, or 
max-two scoring methods, r(106) = .03, p = .77. We also examined pre-to-post percent change in 
divergent creativity scores (as in Baird et al., 2012), but these did not correlate with incubation 
TUT rates, either: average r(104) = .02, p = .83; top-two r(104) = −.02, p = .82; max-two r(104) 
= −.05, p = .63 (nor did TUT rates correlate with a simple pre-to-post difference score, with rs = 
−.11 to −.02, ps = .26 to .81). 
Once again, we tested via hierarchical linear regression whether the interaction between WMC 
and TUT rates could predict divergent creativity, with the possibility that people high in 
WMC and TUT rates may be more creative. Table 8 illustrates that it did not. 
 
Table 8. Experiment 2 WMC × TUT Hierarchical Linear Regression on Divergent Thinking 
 95% CI for B 
Predictors B SE β t p Lower Upper 
Block 1 (ΔR2 = .002) 
WMC z 
score 
.011 .034 .032 .331 .741 -.056 .078 
DT TUT 
Rate 
.012 .033 .034 .352 .725 -.054 .077 
Constant 2.033 .033  61.136 .000 1.967 2.099 
Block 2 (ΔR2 = .006) 
WMC × 
TUT 
-.028 .035 -.079 -.795 .428 -.097 .042 
Note. WMC = working memory capacity; DT = divergent thinking; TUT = task-unrelated 
thoughts. N = 108. All predictors are z scores based on the final sample (for centering purposes). 
Does intellectual motivation moderate the association between WMC and creativity? 
Before testing our hypothesis, we first examined the reliabilities of the questionnaires and the 
correlations among the measures. Internal consistency scores were good: Coefficient alpha for 
the Need for Cognition scale (16 items) was .81 and for the Openness scale (48 items) was .89. 
Openness scores correlated positively with Need for Cognition scores, r(113) = .42, p < .001 (see 
also Sadowski & Cogburn, 1997), but nonsignificantly in the opposite direction with 
WMC, r(113) = −.16, p = .10; Need for Cognition’s negative correlation with WMC was of 
similarly modest magnitude, r(113) = −.17, p = .07 (see also Benny & Banks, 2015; Hill et al., 
2013). Regarding divergent creativity, Openness significantly predicted average score, r(106) = 
.26, p < .01 (see Figure 2), and top-two score, r(106) = .20, p < .05, but not the max-two 
score, r(106) = .11, p = .25. In contrast, Need for Cognition did not correlate significantly with 
any measure of postincubation divergent creativity [average r(106) = .01, p = .94; top-
two, r(106) = .01, p = .95; max-two, r(106) = −.03, p = .80]. We also analyzed pre-to-post 
percent change in divergent creativity scores, but these did not correlate with either Openness (rs 
= −.08 to .08, ps = .42 to .59) or Need for Cognition (rs = −.04 to .05, ps = .62 to .81). Thus, 
although subjects who were more open to experience tended to be more divergently creative than 
were those who were less open, their divergent creativity did not benefit any more from an 
incubation period and its attendant mind wandering. 
 
Figure 2. 
Experiment 2 correlation scatterplot between openness and divergent creativity (average 
scoring). 
Several regressions tested our hypothesis that Openness and Need for Cognition might interact 
with WMC to predict divergent thinking. In our first hierarchical linear regression, we entered 
WMC and Openness in Block 1 to predict average postincubation divergent creativity, and added 
their interaction at Block 2 (see Table 9). Likewise, in our second hierarchical linear regression, 
we entered WMC and Need for Cognition in Block 1 and their interaction in Block 2 (see Table 
10). Neither Openness nor Need for Cognition moderated the relation between WMC and 
average postincubation divergent creativity. 
 
Table 9. Experiment 2 WMC × Openness Hierarchical Linear Regression on Divergent Thinking 
 
 95% CI for B 
Predictors B SE β t p Lower Upper 
Block 1 (ΔR2 = .072) 
WMC z score .026 .033 .076 .797 .427 -.039 .091 
Openness .092 .032 .269 2.832 .006 .027 .156 
Constant 2.033 .032 - 63.402 .000 1.970 2.097 
Block 2 (ΔR2 = .000) 
WMC × 
Openness 
.002 .031 .006 .063 .950 -.059 .063 
Note. WMC = working memory capacity. N = 108. All predictors are z scores based on the final 
sample (for centering purposes). 
 
Table 10. Experiment 2 WMC × Need for Cognition Hierarchical Linear Regression on 
Divergent Thinking 
 95% CI for B 
Predictors B SE β t p Lower Upper 
Block 1 (ΔR2 = .001) 
WMC z score .013 .034 .038 .380 .705 -.055 .081 
Need for 
Cognition 
.005 .034 .014 .139 .889 -.063 .072 
Constant 2.033 .033  61.114 .000 1.967 2.099 
Block 2 (ΔR2 = .010) 
WMC × Need 
for Cog 
-.033 .033 -.100 -1.003 .318 -.098 .032 
Note. WMC = working memory capacity; Need for Cog = Need for Cognition. N = 108. All 
predictors are z scores based on the final sample (for centering purposes). 
Secondary and exploratory analyses 
Did executive control variation predict preincubation creative cognition? 
As in Experiment 1, neither WMC nor TUT rate showed any effects here. Preincubation 
divergent creativity scores did not correlate with WMC [average scoring: r(109) = −.04, p = .69; 
top-two scoring: r(109) = .08, p = .38; max-two scoring: r(109) = .03, p = .75] or with TUT rates 
during the divergent-thinking incubation tasks [average scoring: r(109) = .07, p = .47; top-two 
scoring: r(109) = .00, p = .97; max-two scoring: r(109) = .13, p = .17]. 
Is the fantasy facet of Openness associated with incubation TUTs or creative cognition? 
As noted earlier, the Openness subscale comprises six facets (McCrae & Costa, 2010), and we 
were especially interested in the fantasy-TUT correlation. With statements like “I enjoy 
concentrating on a fantasy or daydream and exploring all its possibilities, letting it grow and 
develop” and “I would have difficulty just letting my mind wander without control or guidance” 
(reverse scored), the fantasy facet had face validity in measuring a propensity to mind-wander in 
daily life, or, at least, an imaginative engagement with such experiences. In fact, although the 
fantasy facet (8 items) showed adequate reliability (α = .75), it was not correlated with probed 
TUT rates collapsed across all incubation reading tasks, r(111) = .07, p = .44. 
Regarding the creative aspect of the fantasy scale, and consistent with the daydreaming 
questionnaire findings from Baird et al. (2012), fantasy-facet scores correlated modestly but 
significantly with postincubation divergent creativity based on average and max scoring [r(106) 
= .24, p = .01, and r(106) = .21, p = .03, respectively] and trended similarly for top-two 
scoring, r(106) = .17, p = .07. These fantasy correlations are of similar magnitude to those from 
the overall Openness score, however, which suggests that it is not daydreaming propensity, per 
se, that drives the association between Openness and divergent creativity. 
Discussion 
We designed Experiment 2 as a conceptual replication of Experiment 1 that also addressed new 
questions about creative cognition and personality. Our main findings were that, as in 
Experiment 1, neither WMC nor incubation mind wandering predicted creative responses in 
divergent thinking tasks. Thus, despite modifying our incubation tasks to present science-fiction 
texts, in order to reduce their cognitive demands and align them with “best practices” (Sio & 
Ormerod, 2009), we were still unable to demonstrate any beneficial effects of TUTs on divergent 
thinking. Indeed, as in Experiment 1, any nonsignificant trends suggested by the data tended 
toward the negative, with higher TUT rates weakly predicting lower creative performance. 
The null associations between WMC and TUT rate in Experiment 2 bear consideration, 
particularly because the nonsignificant WMC-TUT correlations trended positive in Experiment 
2, rather than negative as in Experiment 1. Both McVay and Kane (2012b) and Unsworth and 
McMillan (2013) found that higher WMC subjects reported fewer TUTs than did lower WMC 
subjects while reading expository or fictional texts in more traditional formats (i.e., not presented 
word by word in a context of anomaly detection). The current null-to-positive WMC-TUT 
correlations conflict with those prior reports. As in Experiment 1, however, we cannot be certain 
whether a lack of significant (and negative) WMC effects indicates a systematic boundary 
condition around the WMC-TUT association, such as the relatively short durations of these 
tasks, or simply random variation around a true-but-weak negative association between these 
constructs in nature (Randall et al., 2014). 
But what should we make of the null correlation between WMC and divergent thinking, now 
seen across two experiments? On one hand, this finding arguably follows from the perspective 
that a lack of cognitive control might benefit creativity (e.g., Aiello et al., 2012; Chrysikou & 
Thompson-Schill, 2011), insofar as WMC correlates positively with so many other domains of 
higher-order cognitive ability, but not this one. On the other hand, a null WMC-creativity 
association is surprising because divergent thinking correlates positively with fluid intelligence 
(e.g., Silvia, 2008a, 2008b; Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011), which shares at least half its variance with 
WMC (e.g., Kane et al., 2005; Oberauer et al., 2005). The strongest evidence for an effect of 
fluid intelligence on divergent thinking comes from latent-variable models, where the variance 
common to the intelligence measures, and the variance common to the divergent creativity 
measures, are statistically isolated from the method or rater variance that also contribute to the 
individual task scores. So, to provide the most rigorous test for any WMC-creativity association, 
we collapsed data across both experiments and used structural equation modeling to create two 
models of divergent creativity—one using average scoring, and the other using top two scoring 
(see Figure 3). In both models, WMC was indicated by operation span and symmetry span, with 
the two paths constrained to be equal and the WMC variance set to 1. Likewise, Divergent 
Thinking was indicated by Brick and Knife and those two paths were set to be equal with the 
Divergent Thinking variance set to 1. Finally, Brick and Knife were each indicated by the three 
raters’ scores. 
 
Figure 3. Structural equation model with data collapsed across Experiments 1 and 2 (average 
scoring). Ospan = operation span; Sspan = symmetry span; WMC = working memory capacity; 
DT = divergent thinking. ** p < .01. 
Both models of WMC and divergent thinking had good fit, regardless of using average scoring, 
χ2(16) = 26.392, p = .049; CFI = 0.978; RMSEA = 0.053, 90% CI = [0.004, 0.087]; SRMR = 
0.045, or top two scoring, χ2(16) = 24.257, p = .084; CFI = 0.980; RMSEA = 0.047, 90% CI = 
[0.00, 0.083]; SRMR = 0.039. In both models, all paths were statistically significant except for 
our correlation of interest—the relation between WMC and Divergent Thinking (average 
scoring: β = .04, p = .79; top two scoring: β = .06, p = .62). These modeling findings provide 
compelling evidence that WMC does not influence divergent creativity. As noted above, 
although a view that executive control may be harmful to creativity should predict a negative 
correlation between WMC and divergent thinking, the null correlations we observe suggest, at 
least, that executive control is not helpful and this finding stands in stark contrast to others on 
higher-order cognitive functions. We suggest that future research should explore the surprising 
discrepancy indicated here between the predictive powers of WMC and fluid intelligence, by 
having subjects complete tests of all three constructs and testing whether the fluid intelligence 
variance that is not shared with WMC is that which predicts variation in divergent thinking. 
Experiment 2 explored new hypotheses about personality, primarily whether intellectual 
motivation—as measured by Openness to Experience and Need for Cognition—moderated the 
relation between WMC and creative cognition (see Dollinger, 2003; McCrae, 1987). Although 
we found that Openness predicted postincubation divergent thinking, neither it nor Need for 
Cognition acted as a moderator. Thus, WMC’s null associations with divergent thinking in 
Experiments 1 and 2 did not likely arise from a lack of curiosity or motivation in our student 
sample. 
Our exploratory assessments of the Openness fantasy facet indicated that it did not correlate with 
TUT rates during ongoing tasks, but it did modestly predict divergent thinking. We suggest that 
the fantasy measure did not correlate with TUTs, in part, because fantasy-facet items ask more 
about one’s feelings toward, and active approaches to, daydreaming than about its sheer 
frequency; fantasy scores may thus better reflect one’s imaginative engagement with fantasy and 
daydreams than one’s propensity to engage in mind wandering while performing other tasks. If 
so, it follows that people who are more creative generally will also be more creative with their 
own subjective experiences. Note that this plausible interpretation turns the presumed 
directionality of the creativity–mind wandering association on its head—rather than mind 
wandering boosting creativity, perhaps creativity boosts imaginative or constructive mind 
wandering. As well, the fact that the overall Openness score (which comprises not only fantasy-
proneness but also intellectual curiosity, aesthetic appreciation, emotionality, and open-
mindedness) predicted divergent thinking as well as did the fantasy-specific facet score, suggests 
that daydreaming propensity or quality is not central—and thus not causal—in the association 
between Openness and creativity. Among its other goals described below, Experiment 3 tested 
whether two more straightforward retrospective measures of mind-wandering frequency would 
correlate more strongly with probed TUT rates, and whether they would also predict variation in 
creative cognition (as in Baird et al., 2012). 
Experiment 3 
As mentioned previously, while data collection for our Experiment 2 was ongoing, Baird et al. 
(2012) published results suggesting that greater mind wandering is correlated with greater 
divergent creativity. Baird et al. compared different types of incubation activities—a demanding 
task, an undemanding task, unstructured rest, or no break—during divergent thinking. They 
found that only the undemanding incubation-task group improved in creativity scores from pre- 
to postincubation. Importantly, this same group reported the most mind wandering during 
incubation, according to a retrospective questionnaire that immediately followed the incubation 
period. Thus, Baird et al. presented correlational evidence that two different dependent 
measures, mind wandering and divergent-thinking improvement, were both increased by the 
experimental manipulation of reducing incubation-task demand. Divergent thinking scores also 
correlated positively with scores on a general measure of daydreaming propensity in daily life 
(the Daydreaming Frequency subscale of the Imaginal Process Inventory; Singer & Antrobus, 
1972). These experimental and individual-differences findings led Baird and colleagues to 
conclude that mind wandering facilitates creative problem solving, although it’s important to 
understand that their design did not actually provide experimental evidence for a causal effect of 
mind wandering on creativity. 
Our first two experiments might be considered failed “conceptual replications” of the Baird et al. 
(2012) study, insofar as they provided no individual-differences support for the claim that mind-
wandering enables divergent creativity. Indeed, we take Underwood’s (1975) perspective that 
individual-differences findings should serve as early falsification tests for emerging theory, and 
so our consistent null results provide a significant refutation of the notion that creative cognition 
(at least as indicated by divergent thinking) arises from uncontrolled, off-task thought (see 
also Singer & Antrobus, 1963). We must acknowledge, however, that we may have failed to find 
evidence of TUT-inspired creativity because our incubation tasks were akin to the Baird et al. 
“demanding” task, which elicited no apparent mind-wandering benefit (our incubation tasks did, 
however, produce substantial mind-wandering rates, with Ms of .30–.40 and rates of .50–.60 
within +1 SD, and so if mind wandering actually drives incubation benefits, we should have seen 
them). The Baird et al. demanding task was a 12 min, numerical version of the 1-back task, in 
which rare colored digits prompted a 1-back parity judgment (black digits required no response); 
our 20 min 2-back tasks from Experiment 1 were almost certainly more demanding than this. 
Although it’s less clear that our reading-anomaly tasks from Experiment 2 were as challenging as 
the Baird et al. “demanding” 1-back task, they do seem more demanding than their 
“undemanding” task of responding to rare colored digits with a concurrent parity judgment (a 0-
back task). 
In Experiment 3, then, we replaced the 20 min incubation tasks with the 12 min undemanding 
digit task from Baird et al. (2012), who promptly provided their materials to us. We also replaced 
the noncognitive measures from Experiment 2 with the Daydreaming Frequency Scale (as in 
Baird et al.) and the Mind Wandering Scale from the same instrument (which not only measures 
frequency of mind-wandering experiences, but also frames some questions around 
succeeding/failing to concentrate on ongoing tasks). These questionnaires allowed us to test 
whether general retrospective measures of mind-wandering frequency and activity predict 
divergent thinking (as in Baird et al., and arguably consistent with Experiment 2’s fantasy-scale 
findings) and whether they predicted in-the-moment TUT rates (which fantasy scores did not 
predict). 
Despite our using the Baird et al. (2012) undemanding incubation task and our adjusting the 
timing of task events to mimic theirs, Experiment 3 was not intended as a “close” replication of 
that study because we focused on correlational rather than experimental effects, and we thought 
it important to maintain critical aspects of our prior design. The most significant differences 
between our studies were the following: (a) we kept our online thought probes to measure in-the-
moment TUTs during the incubation period (rather than relying on Baird’s single retrospective 
questionnaire following incubation, which is vulnerable to memory biases and mental 
aggregation errors); (b) we assessed divergent thinking in the alternative uses task using 
subjective ratings (rather than using the uniqueness of each response as Baird’s criterion for 
creativity, which is a problematic dependent measure; see Silvia et al., 2008); (c) we explicitly 
instructed subjects to be creative in their responding rather than to simply generate many 
responses, which is critical to actually assessing creative thinking rather than memory fluency 
(see Nusbaum et al., 2014); (d) we had subjects complete only one alternative uses task rather 
than several; and (e) we included measures of WMC and a Mind Wandering scale. 
Method 
Subjects 
Just as we did in our previous experiments, we aimed to collect data from approximately 130 
subjects (here, across 2 semesters worth of time that spanned half of a Fall, a full Spring, and 
half a Summer semester). In exchange for participating in a single 60 min session, 132 UNCG 
undergraduates earned either partial credit toward an introductory psychology course 
requirement or $15 (five of these 132 participants did not complete the entire session). Paid 
participants (N = 40) were recruited by posting flyers in classroom buildings around campus, 
particularly in those that housed fine arts, music, and theater departments and courses, in an 
effort to recruit more prototypically “creative” students than might otherwise enroll in 
introductory psychology. 
Working memory span tasks 
We used the same two complex span tasks as before, operation span and symmetry span, to 
measure working memory capacity. 
Mind-wandering assessment: Ongoing tasks and thought probes 
We measured mind wandering using the same probes as in the previous two experiments. Here, 
however, subjects completed no stand-alone task and only one incubation task (for the one 
alternative uses task), which took about 12 min to complete. 
Undemanding 0-back task 
A series of numbers (1–8) appeared on screen, one at a time, for 1000 ms, followed by a fixation 
cross for 1,500 ms. If the number appeared in green, participants responded to this target trial by 
pressing the F key if the number was odd or the J key if the number was even (4% of the 250 
trials). If the number appeared in black, subjects withheld responding (96% of trials). 
Mind-wandering probes 
Subjects responded to 14 thought probes appearing unpredictably during the 0-back incubation 
task. This thought-probe rate was comparable to those in the Experiments 1 and 2 incubation 
tasks, adjusting for task length. Although probes were identical to those in Experiments 1 and 2, 
they did not appear only after rare target stimuli. 
Mind-wandering assessment: Retrospective questionnaires 
Subjects completed two subscales from the Imaginal Process Inventory (IPI), Daydreaming 
Frequency (e.g., “When I am not paying close attention to my job, a book, or TV, I tend to be 
daydreaming”; “I lose myself in active daydreaming”; “Whenever I have time on my hands I 
daydream”) and Mind Wandering (e.g., “At times it is hard for me to keep my mind from 
wandering”; “During a lecture or speech, my mind often wanders”; “No matter how hard I try to 
concentrate, thoughts unrelated to my work always creep in”). Each subscale presented 12 items, 
and subjects responded to each item by selecting one of five multiple-choice options. None of the 
Daydreaming Frequency items were reverse-scored but six of the Mind Wandering items were. 
Items were scored on a 1–5 scale and then summed within the subscale, with higher scores 
indicating more daydreaming or mind wandering, and a maximum score of 60 on each. 
Divergent thinking task 
We used only one version of the alternative uses task, the brick task, to measure divergent 
creativity. In line with the time limits from Baird et al. (2012), subjects had only 4 min to come 
up with as many creative uses for a brick as they could (rather than 10 min, as in Experiments 1 
and 2). After the first 2 min of working on the brick task, subjects switched to the 0-back 
incubation task for approximately 12 min, and then returned to the brick task for another 2 min. 
Similar to Experiments 1 and 2, at the end of the session, subjects selected their top two answers 
among their preincubation responses, postincubation responses, and all of their responses. 
Because we only used the brick version of the divergent thinking task, and the procedure of that 
task also differed from the previous two experiments, raters scored these responses separately 
from the responses in Experiments 1 and 2. The raters and rating procedure, however, were the 
same as in the previous experiments. 
General procedure 
Subjects completed the 60 min session in groups of 1 to 4. The same computers as in 
Experiments 1 and 2 presented all tasks. Subjects first completed a demographic questionnaire, 
followed by operation span, the alternative uses task (brick), symmetry span, and finally, the IPI 
questionnaire subscales. 
Results 
Subjects 
Data from 20 subjects were eliminated for processing-portion errors on either WMC task (i.e., 
processing accuracy below 85%, as in Experiments 1 and 2). Using the same criterion as in 
Experiments 1 and 2, outliers were determined by looking at incubation-period nontarget 
accuracy, but similar to Experiment 2, no one had accuracy ≤75%, and so all data from 
remaining subjects were retained (mean 0-back accuracy and RTs can be found in Appendix E). 
Data from 107 subjects were included for analyses, who ranged in age from 18–29 years (M = 
19.63, 61.7% female). By self-report, the final sample’s racial composition was 52.3% White, 
29.0% African American, 7.5% Asian, 7.5% Multiracial, and 2.8% Other. Additionally, 
regarding self-reported ethnicity (reported separately), 7.5% identified as Latino/Hispanic. Of the 
40 people recruited from flyers around campus, 33 had viable data and, of those, eight reported 
seeing the flyer in a “creative” building (i.e., fine arts, music, or theater). 
Primary analyses 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, we begin with hypothesis-driven confirmatory analyses; the 
subsequent section reports secondary and exploratory analyses. 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 11 presents descriptive statistics for WMC, TUT, and questionnaire measures; Table 
12 reports their correlations. As before, we averaged operation span and symmetry span to create 
a WMC z score composite measure. Mean WMC z scores in this sample of for-credit and for-pay 
subjects were significantly higher in Experiment 3 (M = 0.24, SD = 0.71) than in both 
Experiment 1 (M = −0.00, SD = 0.78), t(225) = 2.37, p = .02, 95% CI [−0.43, −0.04], d = 0.32, 
and Experiment 2 (M = −0.21, SD = 0.84), t(221) = 4.24, p < .001, 95% CI [−0.65, −0.24], d = 
0.57. 
 
Table 11. Experiment 3 Descriptive Statistics for Working Memory Capacity Tasks, Mind-
Wandering Rates, and Questionnaire Measures 
Task N Mean SD Min Max Skew Kurtosis 
Sspan Z 107 .228 .969 -1.853 1.959 -.318 -.844 
Ospan Z 107 .243 .763 -2.140 1.546 -.697 -.111 
WMC Z 107 .235 .708 -1.742 1.518 -.492 -.468 
Brick TUT 107 .475 .250 0 1 -.142 -.735 
Daydreaming Q 105 40.524 8.916 21 59 -.227 -.434 
Mind Wandering 
Q 
105 38.657 6.251 24 56 .387 .400 
Note. Z = z scores based on database of more than 3000 people; WMC = working memory 
capacity; TUT = task-unrelated thoughts; Q = questionnaire. 
 
Table 12. Experiment 3 Correlations Among Working Memory Capacity Tasks, Mind-
Wandering Rates, and Questionnaire Measures 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Sspan Z 1.00      
2. Ospan Z .33* 1.00     
3. WMC Z .86** .76** 1.00    
4. Brick TUTs .10 -.02 .06 1.00   
5. Daydreaming Q .00 .16 .09 .21* 1.00  
6. Mind Wandering Q -.08 -.02 -.06 .29* .51** 1.00 
Note. Z = z scores based on database of more than 3,000 people; WMC = working memory 
capacity; TUT = task-unrelated thought proportion; Q = questionnaire. N = 105–107. *p < .05. 
** p < .01. 
TUT rates during the Brick task were higher in the 0-back task in Experiment 3 (M = 0.47, SD = 
0.25) than in the 2-back task in Experiment 1 (M = 0.40, SD = 0.24), t(225) = 2.41, p = .02, 95% 
CI [−0.14, −0.01], d = 0.32, and the reading-anomaly task in Experiment 2 (M = 0.30, SD = 
0.25), t(221) = 5.39, p < .001, 95% CI [−0.24, −0.11], d = 0.72. As in Experiment 2, WMC 
correlations with TUT rates varied nonsignificantly around 0, but trended toward weakly 
positive. Unlike the Openness or Fantasy facet scores from Experiment 2, both the Daydreaming 
and Mind Wandering subscales correlated positively and significantly with probed TUT rates. 
Finally, interrater reliability was adequate for the brick divergent thinking task, with a coefficient 
alpha of .721. 
Is executive control helpful or harmful for creativity? 
Once again, WMC did not predict postincubation divergent creativity, regardless of whether we 
used average, r(102) = −.03, p = .79, top-two, r(102) = .00, p = .96, or max-two scoring, r(102) = 
.03, p = .79. Also replicating our prior findings, mind wandering during incubation did not 
measurably benefit postincubation divergent creativity, either for average scoring, r(102) = 
−.05, p = .63, top-two scoring, r(102) = .02, p = .82, or max-two scoring, r(102) = −.08, p = .40; 
moreover, just as in Experiments 1 and 2, percent change in divergent creativity from pre- to 
postincubation was not correlated with incubation TUT rates: average r(101) = −.09, p = .39, 
top-two r(101) = .05, p = .61, max-two r(101) = −.09, p = .38 (nor did TUT rates correlate with a 
simple pre-to-post difference score, with rs = −.09 to .05, ps = .38 to .61). 
Finally, we tested whether the Mind Wandering or Daydreaming Frequency subscales predicted 
postincubation divergent creativity. All Mind Wandering subscale correlations were 
nonsignificant and very near zero: average r(100) = .01, p = .91; top-two r(100) = −.02, p = .81; 
max-two r(100) = −.06, p = .57. The Daydreaming subscale, in contrast, showed weak positive 
correlations with divergent thinking, but none of them quite reached conventional levels of 
significance: average r(100) = .14, p = .17; top-two r(100) = .20, p = .05; max-two r(100) = 
.14, p = .16. Moreover, Daydreaming scores did not correlate significantly with pre-to-post 
incubation changes in creativity: average r(100) = −.03, p = .80; top-two r(100) = .10, p = .31; 
max-two r(100) = .03, p = .79, suggesting that daydreaming did not influence creative 
incubation. 
Just as we had done previously, we again tested whether the interaction between WMC and mind 
wandering predicted divergent creativity, that is, whether those high in both WMC and TUT rate 
might be most creative. We tested this via three separate regressions, using incubation TUT rate, 
Daydreaming subscale score, and Mind Wandering subscale score (see Table 13). For all three, 
we first entered WMC and a mind-wandering measure at Step 1, and then added the interaction 
between the two at Step 2. None of the mind-wandering indicators interacted with WMC to 
predict average postincubation divergent creativity. 
 
Table 13. Experiment 3 Hierarchical Linear Regressions on Divergent Thinking 
 95% CI for B 
Predictors B SE β t p Lower Upper 
WMC × Brick TUT hierarchical linear regression (N = 104) 
Block 1 (ΔR2 = .003) 
WMC z score -.010 .043 -.023 -.234 .815 -.095 .075 
Brick TUT Rate -.020 .042 -.047 -.468 .641 -.103 .064 
Constant 2.249 .042 - 53.703 .000 2.166 2.332 
Block 2 (ΔR2 = .001) 
WMC × TUT -.011 .041 -.028 -.275 .784 -.093 .070 
WMC × Daydreaming subscale hierarchical linear regression (N = 102) 
Block 1 (ΔR2 = .022) 
WMC z score -.024 .040 -.059 -.592 .555 -.104 .056 
Daydreaming score .058 .040 .144 1.443 .150 -.022 .137 
Constant 2.240 .040  56.601 .000 2.162 2.319 
Block 2 (ΔR2 = .014) 
WMC × 
Daydreaming 
-.053 .044 -.123 -1.208 .230 -.140 .034 
WMC × Mind Wandering subscale hierarchical linear regression (N = 102) 
Block 1 (ΔR2 = .002) 
WMC z score -.017 .041 -.041 -.412 .681 -.097 .064 
Mind Wandering 
score 
.004 .040 .010 .103 .918 -.076 .084 
Constant 2.240 .040  56.015 .000 2.161 2.320 
Block 2 (ΔR2 = .014) 
WMC × Mind 
Wandering 
-.048 .041 -.119 -1.160 .249 -.130 .034 
Note. WMC = working memory capacity; TUT = task-unrelated thoughts during brick 
incubation; Daydreaming = score on the daydreaming subscale; Mind wandering = score on the 
Mind Wandering subscale. All predictors are z scores based on the final sample (for centering 
purposes). 
Secondary and exploratory analyses 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, we asked whether executive control variation predicts preincubation 
creative cognition. The answer was again, “no.” Preincubation divergent creativity ratings were 
not predicted by WMC [average: r(104) = .02, p = .85; top-two: r(104) = .08, p = .43; max-
two: r(104) = .05, p = .64] or incubation-period TUT rate (average: r(104) = .09, p = .37; top-
two: r(104) = −.04, p = .72; max-two: r(104) = .05, p = .63). 
Discussion 
Experiment 3 modified the Baird et al. (2012) incubation methods to bring our procedures more 
in line with one that appeared to demonstrate the benefits of mind wandering for creative 
cognition. Specifically, we used their low-demand (0-back) incubation task—which was nearly 
half the length of our incubation periods from Experiments 1 and 2—in addition to shortening 
our alternative uses tasks and including the Daydreaming Frequency subscale of the IPI. At least 
with respect to individual differences in divergent creativity, we once again failed to find any 
significant facilitation from incubation-period mind wandering: The rate at which subjects 
reported TUTs during the incubation task did not correlate with their postincubation creative 
output (or with their pre-to-post change in creative output) in the divergent thinking task. Our 
most important finding, then, is that people who mind wander more during an undemanding 
incubation task produce no more creative output in a divergent thinking task than do those who 
mind wander less. This individual-differences finding (which replicates those from Experiments 
1 and 2), provides compelling evidence against theoretical claims that mind wandering enhances 
creative thought. 
The only positive evidence from Experiment 3 for the ostensible benefits of mind wandering was 
a near-significant correlation (p = .05) between top-two-scored divergent thinking and the IPI 
Daydreaming subscale (r = .20 [.01, .38]), which was of similar magnitude to that from Baird et 
al. (2012; r = .22 [.06, .37]). Although the other two scoring methods did not yield significant 
correlations with Daydreaming (rs = .14 [−.06, .33]), we consider the top-two result to represent 
a positive conceptual replication of Baird et al. because it very closely matched the original 
effect size despite our sample being a bit smaller (see Simonsohn, 2015). At the same time, 
Daydreaming scores did not correlate with the pre-to-post changes in creativity with incubation 
(see also Baird et al.), and so the questionnaire findings seem to disconfirm the theoretical claim 
that incubation benefits derive from mind wandering. 
The Daydreaming results suggest that people who report more off-task thinking in everyday life 
are also a bit more creative overall, but the similar IPI Mind Wandering subscale did not 
correlate with any of our divergent thinking indices (rs = −.06 to .01). So, mind-wandering 
propensity, itself, does not seem linked to creative thought. We therefore interpret the 
questionnaire data, along with the fantasy-facet findings from Experiment 2, to indicate that 
divergent creativity is not associated with simply more off-task thinking, but rather with a certain 
kind of off-task thinking—namely, one that is mainly positive, intentional and, perhaps also, 
creative (McMillan et al., 2013; Singer, 1966). Indeed, several of the Daydreaming items that 
were most strongly correlated with divergent thinking scores reflected a propensity for off-task 
thought when otherwise idle: “Whenever I have time on my hands I daydream” (r = .18); “When 
I am at a meeting or show that is not very interesting, I daydream rather than pay attention” (r = 
.16); “On a long bus, train, or airplane ride I daydream” (r= .23). 
In contrast, divergent thinking was uncorrelated with a Daydreaming item about off-task thought 
at work or school (“I daydream at work (or school)”; r = .02), or with several work- or school-
related items from the Mind Wandering scale: “My mind seldom wanders while I am working” 
(r = .03); “My mind seldom wanders from my work” (r = −.03); “During a lecture or speech, my 
mind often wanders” (r = −.12); “No matter how hard I concentrate, thoughts unrelated to my 
work always creep in” (r = .01); “During a speech, meeting, or lecture, I often ‘come to,’ 
realizing that I have not heard a word the speaker was saying” (r = .00). Creative people do not 
struggle, then, to maintain on-task thoughts while engaged in demanding activities; rather, 
creative people may choose to engage in daydreaming when it will not otherwise be costly. From 
this perspective, however, daydreaming does not necessarily provide fodder for creative 
cognition, but rather a creative talent or outlook may allow or encourage more positive-
constructive daydreaming, particularly during cognitive “down time”. The causal direction of 
any modest link between creativity and retrospective reports of daily life mind wandering, then, 
is currently ambiguous—if there is, in fact, any causal link between them. A third variable like 
openness to experience may cause them both, given that we found general Openness scores, 
which comprise much more than just fantasy and daydreaming, to predict divergent thinking as 
well as did the fantasy-specific facet. 
Regarding individual differences in WMC, our findings indicated no association with 
postincubation divergent thinking quality (or with pre-to-post increases in divergent thinking), 
and no interaction of WMC with mind-wandering in predicting divergent creativity, replicating 
Experiments 1 and 2. Our data also showed no WMC correlation with incubation-task TUT rate, 
which replicates prior findings that, during simple vigilance tasks requiring little executive 
control, WMC is unrelated to mind-wandering vulnerability (Baird, Smallwood, & Schooler, 
2011; McVay & Kane, 2012a). 
General Discussion 
Our three individual-differences studies provide little evidence for claims that executive-control 
processes are helpful for, or harmful to, creative cognition; in short, indices of executive-control 
variation were uncorrelated with performance on divergent-thinking tasks. We specifically tested 
the potential influence of normal variation in WMC and mind-wandering propensity on creative 
problem solving that was interrupted—and to be facilitated—by a brief incubation period. Of 
most importance, WMC did not correlate with postincubation divergent thinking scores (in all 
three experiments); we also found (in all three experiments) that rates of self-reported TUTs 
during incubation tasks were not correlated with quality of divergent thinking, despite using 
incubation tasks of varying demand (and yielding varying TUT rates) across experiments. The 
null effects we produced in predicting divergent creativity are credible and meaningful because: 
(a) our samples were adequately powered to detect moderate effect sizes; (b) the measures we 
used to assess working memory capacity, mind wandering, and divergent thinking were valid, 
being motivated by theory and representing prototypical instruments in their respective research 
literatures; moreover, our measures were reliable, showing substantial correlations with other 
tasks of the same construct (e.g., between WMC tasks, across incubation-period TUT 
assessments, between divergent thinking tasks); (c) we observed the same patterns of null results 
across three separate experiments; (d) the null correlations were set within a nomological net of 
significant correlations, such as probed TUT rate with Daydreaming and Mind Wandering 
questionnaires (Experiment 3), and divergent-thinking scores with Openness and fantasy scales 
(Experiment 2) and with a Daydreaming questionnaire (Experiment 3). 
The general retrospective questionnaires about daydreaming and fantasy experiences (and, more 
generally, Openness to experience) provided the only significant results related to the potential 
benefits of mind wandering for creative cognition. In Experiment 2, the fantasy facet of 
Openness did not correlate with probed TUT rates during incubation, but it did positively predict 
postincubation divergent thinking ratings. In Experiment 3, questionnaire measures of 
Daydreaming and Mind Wandering were both correlated with incubation-period TUT rates, but 
only the Daydreaming scale—which, like the fantasy measure—likely reflected quality of off-
task thinking rather than just quantity—modestly predicted postincubation divergent creativity 
(consistent with the Daydreaming questionnaire findings reported by Baird et al., 2012). In 
summary, then, neither WMC nor immediate-probed TUT reports, our two best indicators of 
executive-control variation, told us anything about our subjects’ divergent thinking capabilities 
(again, despite the WMC tasks, TUT measures, and creativity assessments being reliable and 
well correlated within-constructs). Note also that none of these retrospective measures correlated 
with the increase in creative quality observed between pre- and postincubation (nor did the 
Daydreaming scale in Baird et al.), and so they do not reflect any kind of benefit of in-the-
moment, off-task thinking, for facilitating creative thought. 
Our questionnaire measures of fantasy and off-task thought suggested that better divergent 
thinkers also claim to engage in more fantasy-driven and intentional mind wandering in their 
everyday lives. Of importance, however, our data cannot tell us whether the latter indicates that 
certain conscious experiences are more likely to be the causes, or the effects, of one’s creative 
potential. Given that Openness/fantasy correlated with postincubation divergent creativity 
without correlating with incubation TUT rate, and given that the Daydreaming, but not the Mind 
Wandering, questionnaire correlated with postincubation divergent creativity, and given that 
none of these questionnaires correlated with pre-to-post incubation increases in divergent 
creativity, we suggest that it is more likely that being creative causes people to have more 
elaborate and playful daydreams than it is that having more off-task or stimulus-independent 
thoughts causes people to be more creative or insightful. Indeed, because our findings showed 
that better divergent thinkers were also more generally open to experience than were poorer 
divergent thinkers, even beyond fantasy and daydreaming facets, other aspects of openness are 
likely to be the causal mechanisms behind any association between creativity and endorsement 
of fantasy and daydreaming. 
WMC and Creative Cognition 
Across all three experiments, and in the cross-experimental analyses of Experiments 1 and 2, we 
found that WMC did not predict postincubation divergent creativity (or preincubation creativity, 
for that matter). Previously published studies have reported mixed results regarding the 
correlation between WMC and divergent thinking, with some showing a positive association 
(Benedek et al., 2014; De Dreu et al., 2012) and others showing null results (Lee & Therriault, 
2013; Lin & Lien, 2013, although the latter’s studies were likely underpowered). It is not yet 
clear what accounts for these discrepancies. Our findings (and others’) of null correlations 
between WMC and divergent thinking are surprising, however, given the established relations 
between fluid intelligence and divergent thinking (Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011; Silvia, 2008a) and 
fluid intelligence and WMC (e.g., Kane et al., 2005; Oberauer et al., 2005). If fluid intelligence 
predicts creativity based on the variance that it does not share with WMC, it may suggest 
nonexecutive contributions to the intelligence-creativity link (but see Gilhooly et al., 
2007; Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011). 
An anonymous reviewer suggested that the long duration of our divergent thinking tasks may 
have been important. Beaty and Silvia (2012) asked subjects to generate creative uses for a brick 
for 10 min, and found not only that the responses became more creative over time, but also that 
Gf interacted with time in predicting creativity scores. Specifically, people with higher Gf scores 
showed stable (and high) creativity over time, but people with lower Gf scores showed steeper 
positive slopes in creativity (starting low but increasing with time). Perhaps by providing 10 min 
for divergent thinking in Experiments 1 and 2 (5-min preincubation and 5-min postincubation), 
we allowed our lower WMC subjects to “catch up” to our higher WMC subjects. We see a few 
challenges for this claim. First, De Dreu et al. (2012) found robust associations between WMC 
and several divergent thinking indices in an even longer, 16 min brainstorming task. Second, our 
Experiment 3 allowed subjects only 4 min for divergent thinking (2 min preincubation and 2 min 
postincubation) and WMC did not predict creativity scores there. Third, in all three of our 
experiments, WMC failed to correlate with divergent thinking during the initial preincubation 
periods, which were 5 min, 5 min, and 2 min long in Experiments 1 to 3, respectively. Our 
findings do not appear to be driven, then, by task length. Future work should follow up by testing 
the differential predictive power of WMC and fluid intelligence for creative cognition, across a 
range of different tasks for each construct, and perhaps including convergent creativity measures, 
as well. 
Mind Wandering and Creative Cognition 
We assessed the association between mind-wandering propensity and divergent thinking for two 
reasons. First, normal variation in TUTs during ongoing tasks is often associated with executive 
control, with higher mind-wandering rates associated with poorer control (e.g., McVay & Kane, 
2009; Unsworth & McMillan, 2013), allowing us to further test the control-creativity link. 
Second, divergent thinking improves following incubation periods that are characterized by 
modest cognitive demands (Sio & Ormerod, 2009), and thus may allow mind wandering (Baird 
et al., 2012), which, as a relatively unconstrained and sometimes “playful” form of thought, may 
allow mental access to more remote ideas as fodder for creative solutions (for variations on this 
view, see Baars, 2010; Freud, 1908; Immordino-Yang, Christodoulou, & Singh, 2012; McMillan 
et al., 2013; Schooler et al., 2011; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Both sets of findings lead to 
the prediction that people with higher incubation TUT rates should also show more creative 
thinking. All three of our experiments failed to support that critical theoretical prediction 
(Underwood, 1975), finding no correlation between incubation TUTs and divergent thinking 
quality. People who mind-wandered frequently generated no more (or less) creative uses of 
bricks and knives than did those who mind-wandered infrequently. 
Of course, our critical TUT-rate results conflict with the findings reported by Baird et al. (2012), 
who found that subjects in their least demanding incubation task condition (compared to three 
other incubation groups), retrospectively reported the most incubation mind wandering and also 
showed the most improvement in divergent creativity scores from pre-to-post incubation. In 
effect, Baird et al. demonstrated a correlation between two previously well-known findings—that 
easier tasks promote higher TUT rates, and easier tasks promote greater incubation benefit—
within a single study design. This already highly cited study (187 Google Scholar citations as of 
September 18, 2015) seems to support the claim that mind wandering facilitates creative, 
divergent thinking, but as we noted earlier, their study was not designed to provide experimental 
evidence for their causal claim that mind wandering affects creativity; instead, they found that 
their manipulated variable (incubation task demand) had correlated effects on their two 
dependent variables, retrospective mind-wandering reports and divergent creativity-score 
increase. 
We did not design our individual-differences studies to experimentally manipulate incubation-
task demands to evaluate corresponding changes in TUTs or creativity, but our Experiments 1 
and 2 did present a kind of “natural experiment” by using different incubation tasks in the 
context of an otherwise identical design. Recall that Experiment 1 presented a 2-back task during 
incubation and Experiment 2 presented an anomaly detection task within word-by-word reading 
of science fiction stories. Using a set of t tests to compare the alternative uses tasks and the 
incubation periods therein, we found that TUT rates were significantly higher in Experiment 1 
(M = .41, SD = .20) than in Experiment 2 (M = .31, SD = .21), t(233) = 3.74, p < .001, 95% CI 
[0.05, 0.15], d = 0.49; this percent increase in TUTs from Experiment 2 to Experiment 1 is 
considerably larger than that found between the Baird et al. demanding and undemanding 
incubation tasks. However, contrary to the Baird et al. (2012) results, pre- to postincubation 
divergent creativity change did not differ between our experiments and, if anything, trended in 
the wrong direction (Experiment 1: M = +10.27, SD = 14.09; Experiment 2: M = +9.15, SD = 
16.07); t(221) = 0.55, p = .58, 95% CI [−2.86, 5.10], d = 0.07). 
Why did our incubation-task findings differ from those of Baird et al. (2012)? Although both 
studies inserted incubation tasks into a divergent thinking task, there are key differences between 
them. We contend that all of these differences make our methods superior for testing the 
theoretical claims of interest:  
1. We measured mind wandering during the incubation tasks, themselves, where off-task 
thought has been proposed to have its causal effects, and we used in-the-moment, online 
thought probes that minimize memory biases. Baird et al., in contrast, used a single 
retrospective measure, asking subjects after the incubation period to estimate how 
frequently their minds had wandered during the incubation task (on a 1–5 scale). 
2. Our study actually tested the critical correlation between incubation TUT rates and 
creative output, and we found it to be zero; we assume that Baird et al. did not report the 
comparable correlations from their study because they were underpowered within each of 
their experimental conditions. 
3. Although the divergent thinking tasks were very similar across studies, the instructions 
and, thus, what we likely measured in subjects, differed. Our instructions emphasized to 
subjects that the creative quality of their output was most important, whereas Baird et al. 
appeared to have emphasized that the quantity of their creative output was most 
important; we (and others) argue that responses based on creativity instructions better 
capture the creative-thinking construct than do those based on fluency (Harrington, 1975; 
Nusbaum et al., 2014). 
4. The two studies scored divergent thinking differently, and thus likely differed in the 
constructs being measured. Our scoring was based on judgments of three blinded raters, 
who scored each individual response based on uncommonness, remoteness to 
commonplace ideas, and cleverness; Baird et al. scored responses based on uniqueness, 
whereby any responses that appeared only one or two times in the sample received a 
point. Uniqueness scoring has several serious problems (Silvia et al., 2008), only one of 
which was addressed by Baird and colleagues. First, uniqueness scoring is confounded 
with fluency, as subjects who produce more responses have more opportunity to have 
produced more unique responses (uniqueness and fluency correlate near .90; e.g., 
Torrance, 2008); to address this critique, Baird et al. also scored subjects’ output for 
fluency and concluded that, because there were no differences in postincubation fluency 
scores among experimental groups, fluency did not drive the corresponding group 
differences in uniqueness (i.e., in creativity). We suggest that the Baird et al. fluency 
analysis does not solve all of the problems with uniqueness scoring, nor does it actually 
address whether their key dependent variable—percent change in uniqueness—was 
independent of percent change in fluency. Uniqueness scoring is also problematic 
because it does not take appropriateness of responses into consideration. Although 
uniqueness may be a necessary feature of creativity, it is not sufficient—creative 
solutions to problems are not only original, but also apt; random and nonsensical 
responses to a creative prompt may be unique, but they are not valued as creative. A final 
deficiency in uniqueness scoring is that it depends upon sample size, effectively 
punishing more powerful designs—any particular response is less likely to be considered 
unique as sample size grows, perversely making it more difficult to measure creativity in 
the large sample sizes required by individual-differences analyses. 
Our primary conclusion is therefore that mind wandering during incubation periods does not 
contribute to creative, divergent thinking, or individual differences therein, at least as they are 
measured in the laboratory. Our findings also call into question whether mind wandering is more 
generally beneficial to creativity. On one hand, it is logically possible that incubation periods that 
allow for more mind wandering actually boost everyone’s creative thinking to about the same 
extent, suggesting that the Baird et al. (2012) conclusions are valid for cross-context 
comparisons, but not for individual-differences comparisons. On the other hand, although this is 
logically possible, it is not theoretically plausible or coherent: If the cognitive processes engaged 
by mind wandering actually facilitate the creative quality of one’s ongoing and subsequent 
thoughts (as in an incubation-type context), then people who engage in more of that creativity-
facilitating mind wandering should show measurable benefits in creativity relative to those who 
engage in less mind wandering. Given that these straightforward individual-differences 
predictions were contradicted by the results of our three experiments, it suggests that something 
else about contexts that increase mind wandering is ultimately responsible for boosting divergent 
thinking. That is, it seems that mind-wandering propensity is not causal in facilitating creative 
thought, and that some third variable in Baird et al. produced the relative increases in both mind 
wandering and divergent thinking in the undemanding-incubation condition. 
We do acknowledge, in any case, that no one study, or set of studies, is conclusive. It remains 
possible that variants on our laboratory methods might ultimately produce positive evidence for 
creative facilitation by mind wandering. For example, parametrically varying the length of time 
between thought probes (and so providing variable time to maintain a particular train of thought), 
might allow for the detection of a “sweet spot” for a mind-wandering benefit; or, perhaps, 
experimentally manipulating subjects’ motivation, or the relevance of some particular expertise, 
might show that some minimal emotional investment might be necessary for mind wandering to 
facilitate divergent thinking. 
Moreover, mind wandering and creativity “in the wild” may be more closely associated than our 
laboratory-TUT findings indicate. Both our retrospective questionnaire data (from Openness and 
Daydreaming scales), and those from Baird et al., indicate that people who report experiencing 
more fantastical and positive-constructive daydreaming in their everyday lives perform 
somewhat more creatively on laboratory tasks (but see Singer & Antrobus, 1963). As we noted 
above, however, these associations are on the weak side (arising in only one of our three 
divergent-thinking dependent variables), and they also leave ambiguous whether a rich fantasy 
life promotes creativity or creativity promotes a rich fantasy life (or, whether a third variable like 
openness to experience promotes both fantasy and creativity). Finally, although creative 
responses to divergent thinking probes are moderately correlated with “real world” creativity 
(e.g., Beaty, Smeekens, Silvia, Hodges, & Kane, 2013; Silvia et al., 2008), and so laboratory 
creativity measures can tell us something about true creative accomplishments, it may be that the 
fruits of mind wandering are substantially greater when people work on creative projects that are 
very important to them, and when they do so over extended periods of time that cannot be 
approximated by a lab setting. (The latter was loosely suggested by Schooler, Gable, Hopper, & 
Mrazek, unpublished; cited in Smallwood & Schooler, 2015, whose daily life study found that 
creative insights during off-task thinking felt more like “Aha!” experiences to professional 
writers and physicists, but these insights were actually of similar quality to those that came 
during “work” related thought and activity.) 
WMC and Mind Wandering 
Negative correlations between WMC and TUT rates were weak in Experiment 1, evident in only 
some of the demanding incubation tasks. Across all of the incubation tasks in Experiments 2 and 
3, WMC did not predict probe-caught mind wandering in either direction. Although the null 
findings from Experiment 3 were consistent with prior findings of null WMC-TUT associations 
during simple vigilance tasks that require little executive control (Baird et al., 2011; McVay & 
Kane, 2012a), our findings seem inconsistent with the general claim that superior executive 
abilities lead to less frequent mind wandering during ongoing tasks (e.g., McVay & Kane, 2010). 
As we have noted throughout, such findings suggest either some important moderators of the 
WMC-TUT association (such as the executive-control demands, or the length, of the ongoing 
task; Baird et al., 2011; Levinson et al., 2012; McVay & Kane, 2012a), or random variation 
around a relatively weak effect, or both. A recent meta-analytic approach to the question has 
supported the broad theoretical claim that WMC and other indicators of cognitive ability are 
negatively but weakly correlated with mind-wandering propensity during ongoing tasks, 
particularly if those tasks are of long enough duration to challenge sustained attention efforts 
(Randall et al., 2014). 
Conclusions 
Our multi-experiment study of creative, divergent thinking following breaks for incubation 
yielded consistent findings: Across all three experiments, WMC showed no association to 
creative responding during divergent thinking tasks. We also found no evidence that TUT rates, 
as another index of executive-control (in)ability, have any bearing on individual differences in 
creative responding to divergent thinking prompts. In all three experiments, subjects who 
reported high rates of mind wandering when probed during incubation tasks, regardless of the 
particular incubation task used, were no more likely to generate creative ideas than were those 
who reported low rates of mind wandering. The only connection we found between off-task 
thought and creativity was that people who reported on retrospective questionnaires that they 
engaged in frequent and rich fantasy and daydreaming in their daily lives, especially during what 
otherwise might be considered “down time,” showed more creative divergent thinking in the lab 
than did those who reported rich fantasy and daydreaming. This weak association, with rs ≈ .20, 
seems just as likely to indicate that creativity facilitates daydreaming (or that a third variable like 
openness to experience facilitates both daydreaming and creativity) as it is to indicate that 
daydreaming facilitates creativity. 
Footnotes 
1 In short, we found that WMC positively predicted postincubation problem solving of Pigpen in 
Experiment 1, but not in Experiment 2, and WMC had no association to Coins solving in either 
experiment; TUT rates did not predict solving either problem in either experiment. For archival 
purposes, we report the methodological details about these insight tasks (along with two 
noninsight tasks that we included to disguise these “trick” problems) and our analyses of their 
data, at the Open Science Framework site: https://osf.io/4du7j/. 
2 As a secondary concern, we investigated whether the modest negative correlation between 
WMC and TUTs in the laboratory (often, r ≈ −.20; Kane & McVay, 2012) might vary with 
subjects’ efforts to concentrate (as it appears to in daily life; Kane et al., 2007). We wondered 
whether WMC might more strongly predict laboratory TUTs on occasions when subjects 
reported actually trying to focus; perhaps the literature has underestimated the correlation 
between WMC and mind-wandering rate because higher WMC subjects weren’t universally 
attempting to control thought during long and boring laboratory tasks. To test this possibility, we 
followed each thought probe with a separate assessment of concentration attempt (i.e., 1–7 
Likert-scale rating, via keypress, for the prompt, “I was trying to concentrate on the current 
task”). In each experiment, we collapsed thought reports across all tasks and measured mind 
wandering on each probe as either “0” (on task) or “1” (off task). Because the outcome measure 
was binary and the concentration responses (Level 1 data) were nested within subjects (Level 2 
data), we used hierarchical linear modeling for binary outcomes with a Bernoulli distribution 
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). We group centered the Level 1, within-subject, variable 
(concentration) and grand-mean centered the Level 2, between-subjects, variable (WMC). Our 
models included fixed effects for concentration at Level 1 and fixed effects for WMC on the 
intercept and on the concentration slope (i.e., a WMC × concentration interaction) at Level 2; we 
also added a random effect for the intercept. Results for each experiment are presented 
in Appendix A. To summarize, concentration ratings negatively predicted TUTs but, contrary to 
our prediction, concentration did not moderate the association between WMC and TUTs. As 
well, a significant person-level random effect on the intercept suggests that there were individual 
differences in TUT rates beyond that accounted for by WMC and concentration. Our findings 
thus indicate that self-reported concentration did not moderate the WMC-TUT associations in the 
lab. Although we found substantial individual and contextual variation in concentration ratings, it 
may be that this variation is restricted compared to that elicited by the full range of everyday 
activities that young adults complete outside the lab. 
3 Some of the divergent thinking analyses in Experiment 1 did not include data from all 120 
people because not everyone generated responses to both tasks. 
4 Some of the divergent thinking analyses in Experiment 2 did not include data from all 115 
people because not everyone generated responses to both tasks. 
5 Some of the divergent thinking analyses in Experiment 3 did not include all 107 people 
because not everyone generated responses to both tasks; in addition, for questionnaire analyses, 
two people did not complete the measures because they ran out of time. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: WMC × Concentration Hierarchical Linear Models on Mind Wandering 
Experiment 1 
Fixed effect Coefficient SE t ratio df p 
Note. WMC = working memory capacity; calculated by averaging across operation span and 
symmetry span z scores. Experiment 1 N = 120, Experiment 2 N = 115, Experiment 3 N = 107. 
In these analyses, the main effects of WMC and concentration are represented by β01 and β10, 
respectively, and the interaction between the two is represented by β11. 
Intercept, β00 −.036 .122 −.292 118 .771 
 WMC, β01 −.218 .135 −1.619 118 .108 
Concentration, β10 −1.044 .055 −18.908 13975 .000 
 WMC, β11 .022 .067 .336 13975 .737 
Random effect χ2 SD Variance 
component 
df p 
Intercept, r0 2599.634 1.325 1.755 118 .000 
Experiment 2 
Fixed effect Coefficient SE t ratio df p 
Intercept, β00 −.977 .172 −5.667 113 .000 
 WMC, β01 −.050 .209 −.240 113 .811 
Concentration, β10 −1.100 .063 −17.549 17214 .000 
 WMC, β11 −.109 .098 −1.115 17214 .265 
Random effect χ2 SD Variance 
component 
df p 
Intercept, r0 4126.116 1.811 3.281 113 .000 
Experiment 3 
Fixed effect Coefficient SE t ratio df p 
Intercept, β00 .434 .179 2.427 105 .017 
 WMC, β01 .063 .257 .246 105 .806 
Concentration, β10 −1.189 .106 −11.270 1180 <.001 
 WMC, β11 −.017 .149 −.115 1180 .908 
Random effect χ2 SD Variance 
component 
df p 
Intercept, r0 496.339 1.697 2.880 105 <.001 
 
APPENDIX B: n-back Stimuli for Experiment 1 Mind-Wandering Tasks 
Countries Body parts Instruments Colors 
France Heart Oboe Green 
China Foot Violin Orange 
Spain Head Organ Black 
Italy Hand Banjo Pink 
Russia Brain Piano White 
Brazil Nose Cymbal Brown 
Mexico Arms Tuba Gray 
India Legs Flute Red 
Greece Neck Drum Gold 
Sweden Ear Harp Yellow 
Japan Eye Sax Purple 
Canada Mouth Guitar Blue 
 
APPENDIX C: Experiment 1 Mean Accuracy and Reaction Times by Incubation Task 
Task Accuracy RT 
M SD M SD 
Note. SART = sustained attention response task. 
SART target trials .420 .222 369.469 77.352 
SART nontarget trials .933 .049 446.479 89.661 
Coins n-back target trials .772 .196 850.984 230.546 
Coins n-back nontarget trials .973 .046 1095.834 574.543 
Coins n-back lure trials .870 .108 981.211 298.798 
Pigpen n-back target trials .793 .186 843.432 229.570 
Pigpen n-back nontarget trials .977 .045 1010.872 464.521 
Pigpen n-back lure trials .877 .100 1058.591 321.313 
Brick n-back target trials .768 .215 840.427 229.886 
Brick n-back nontarget trials .970 .048 909.151 465.074 
Brick n-back lure trials .852 .112 1009.053 280.958 
Knife n-back target trials .765 .195 844.443 233.704 
Knife n-back nontarget trials .971 .045 984.665 519.659 
Knife n-back lure trials .876 .097 1053.134 367.940 
 
APPENDIX D: Experiment 2 Mean Accuracy and Reaction Times by Task 
Task Accuracy RT 
M SD M SD 
Note. Reading comprehension questions were scored out of 5. 
Stand-alone reading task target trials .440 .169 492.416 78.146 
Stand-alone reading task nontarget trials .981 .022 514.482 111.037 
Coins reading task target trials .521 .168 473.221 91.447 
Coins reading task nontarget trials .983 .024 487.750 103.516 
Pigpen reading task target trials .497 .179 480.617 99.992 
Pigpen reading task nontarget trials .983 .020 489.136 116.983 
Brick reading task target trials .484 .185 484.864 93.675 
Brick reading task nontarget trials .985 .014 463.303 111.890 
Knife reading task target trials .480 .172 484.397 97.585 
Knife reading task nontarget trials .983 .026 482.256 117.217 
Stand-alone reading comprehension questions 4.388 .892 — — 
Coins reading comprehension questions 4.548 .740 — — 
Pigpen reading comprehension questions 4.362 .973 — — 
Brick reading comprehension questions 4.422 .925 — — 
Knife reading comprehension questions 4.522 .809 — — 
 
APPENDIX E: Experiment 3 Mean Accuracy and Reaction Times for the Brick Incubation 
Task 
Task Accuracy RT 
M SD M SD 
Note. N = 107 for target trial accuracy, nontarget trial accuracy, and target trial reaction 
times; N = 25 for nontarget trial reaction times because of few responses during nontarget 
trials. 
Target trials .878 .125 815.580 141.524 
Nontarget trials .997 .010 936.610 581.192 
 
